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The Arithmetic of Arsenic 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
Abstract 
 
What does cost-benefit mean, or do, in actual practice? When agencies are 
engaging in cost-benefit balancing, what are the interactions among law, science, and 
economics? This Article attempts to answer that question by exploring, in some detail, 
the controversy over EPA’s proposed regulation of arsenic in drinking water. The largest 
finding is that science often can produce only “benefit ranges,” and wide ones at that. 
With reasonable assumptions based on the existing science data, the proposed arsenic 
regulation can be projected to save as few as 0 lives and as many as 112. With reasonable 
assumptions, the monetized benefits of the regulation can range from $0 to $560 million. 
In these circumstances, there is no obviously right decision for government agencies to 
make. These points have numerous implications for lawyers and courts, suggesting the 
ease of bringing legal challenges, on grounds specified here, and the importance of 
judicial deference in the face of scientific uncertainty. There are also policy implications. 
Agencies should be given the authority to issue more targeted, cost-effective regulations. 
They should also be required to accompany the cost-benefit analysis with an effort to 
identify the winners and losers, so as to see if poor people are mostly hurt or mostly 
helped. 
 
 
Americans may disagree about a lot of things, but arsenic isn’t one of 
them. When you turn on the kitchen sink, you ought to be able to drink what 
comes out, without worrying about being poisoned.1 
  
“What we know is a drop, what we do not know—an ocean” (Isaac 
Newton). In spite of significant gains in knowledge, we are still moving mainly 
in the dark when dealing with the quantitative importance of risk factors in 
                                                 
*Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and 
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Laura Warren for 
outstanding research assistance and to Jonathan Baron, Robert Hahn, Lisa Heinzerling, Eric 
Posner, Richard Posner, and participants in a work-in-progress lunch at the Universty of Chicago 
Law School for valuable suggestions on a previous draft. 
1 Rep. David Bonior, quoted in the Chicago Tribune, July 28, 2001, p. 1.  
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chemical carcinogenesis, the mechanisms of action of chemical carcinogens, and 
hence their detection and the assessment of their risks to human health. The basic 
understanding . . . is still missing.”2 
 
  Because the shape of the dose-response curve in the low-dose region 
cannot be verified by measurement, there is no means to determine which shape 
is correct. . . . [W]hen modeling the risks associated with lower doses, the 
dose/risk range in which regulatory agencies and risk assessors are most 
frequently interested, there is a wide divergence in the risk projected by 
[different models, all of which fit existing evidence.] . . . In fact . . . the risks 
predicted by these . . . models produce a 70,000-fold variation in the predicted 
response.3 
 
Additional epidemiological evaluations are needed to characterize the 
dose-response relationship for arsenic-associated cancer and noncancer end 
points, especially at low doses. Such studies are of critical importance for 
improving the scientific validity of risk assessment.4 
 
Anyone who’s read an Agatha Christie mystery knows that arsenic is a 
poison.5 
 
 
Within the past two decades, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has become one 
of the most widely discussed topics in all of regulatory law.6 M u c h  o f  t h e  
discussion is occurring within the three branches of government. The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) has overseen a series of executive orders calling 
for cost-benefit balancing,7 and OMB has attempted to give concrete guidance for 
agencies to follow.8  Courts have adopted a series of cost-benefit default 
principles, authorizing agencies to engage in cost-benefit balancing unless 
                                                 
2Toxicology (Hans Marquardt  et al. eds. 1999). 
3Phillip L. Williams et al., Principles of Toxicology 456 (2000). 
4National Research Council, Arsenic in Drinking Water 3 (1999). 
5Cong. Rec. H4751 (July 27, 2001) (Rep. Anna Eshoo). 
6For an overview, see Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Philosophical, and Economic Perspectives 
(Mathew Adler & Eric Posner eds., 2001). 
7See, e.g., Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1980); Executive Order 12498, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 1036 (1985); Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993). 
8See best practice guidelines, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/ 
index.html. A useful overview is Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 29 Capital U. L. Rev 21, 29–34  (2001).  
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Congress has required otherwise.9  Congress itself has shown considerable 
interest in requiring agencies to compile information on the costs and benefits of 
regulation. 10  At the same time, there has been renewed academic interest in 
CBA, exploring the technique from a variety of perspectives.11  
 
In all of these contexts, however, the discussion has tended to be quite 
abstract. Within the legal culture, there has been little exploration of what CBA 
specifically entails, or of how it might be used or improved by agencies.12 To 
date, there appears to be no sustained investigation of any regulation in which 
CBA proved pivotal to the outcome. In this Article, I hope to begin to fill the gap. 
I do so by exploring one of the most contested early decisions of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under President George W. Bush: the 
suspension of the EPA regulation of arsenic in drinking water.13 Much of the 
contest over that decision has involved a debate about the relevant costs and 
benefits. As we will see, it is possible to draw a range of general lessons from the 
arsenic controversy.  
 
My principal finding is simple: Sometimes the best that can be done is to 
specify an exceedingly  wide “benefits range,” one that does not do a great deal 
to discipline judgment. Much of the discussion will be devoted to establishing 
this insufficiently appreciated point, with some effort to specify the judgments 
that must be made in order both to identify the health benefits and to monetize 
them. As a result of this finding, it would be wrong to have confidence that the 
EPA’s proposed rule, in the Clinton Administration, was either right or wrong.14 
At the same time, I offer three more positive suggestions. First, cost-benefit 
analysis, even with wide ranges, provides an important improvement over the 
“intuitive toxicology” of ordinary people, in which general “affect” helps to 
determine judgment.15 This intuitive toxicology can lead people to large blunders 
in thinking about risk, not excluding the excessive reaction to the Bush 
Administration’s decision to suspend the arsenic rule issued by the Clinton 
Administration.16 Second, considerable progress could be made by authorizing 
                                                 
9See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991). 
10See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. (Safe Drinking Water Act). 
11See Adler & Posner supra n. 6. 
12A superb general discussion in Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Col L Rev 941 (1999). 
1366 Fed. Reg. 28,342 (May 22, 2001). 
14See infra. 
15See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 285 (2001). 
16Id.  
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EPA both to use market incentives and to target drinking water controls to areas 
where they would do the most good. Third,  the EPA should be required to 
provide a distributional analysis, showing who, exactly, would be helped and 
hurt by regulation. In its voluminous materials on the effects of the new arsenic 
rule, for example, the EPA does not say a word about whether poor people 
would bear the sometimes significant costs of the regulation. It would be easier 
to assess the new rule with a clearer sense of the benefited and burdened classes. 
 
More particularly, I suggest that an understanding of the arsenic 
controversy offers seven general lessons.  
 
1.  CBA can sometimes produce an illusion of certainty.17 Even where, as in 
the arsenic case, science has a great deal to offer, the most that the agency 
can be expected to do may be to specify a range, sometimes a wide range, 
without assigning probabilities to various “points” along the spectrum. 
This suggestion should be taken as an attack not on CBA, but on what 
might be described as the false promise of CBA: the thought that science 
and economics, taken together, can produce “bottom lines” to be 
mechanically applied by regulatory agencies. “There is wide recognition 
among experts—but not necessarily in the public opinion—that current 
approaches to the regulation of most agents remain judgmental.”18 
2.  With respect to health benefits, plausible assumptions can lead in 
dramatically different directions. In the case of arsenic, it would be to 
conclude that the annual number of lives saved from EPA’s proposed 
regulation would be as low as 5 or as high as 112—and that the annual 
monetized benefits of the proposed standard would be as high as $1.2 
billion or as low as $10 million! It is worthwhile to pay special attention to 
the dose-response curve, on which direct information is typically absent; I 
will make a particular effort to connect the legal and economic issues 
involved in cost-benefit balancing to the underlying scientific questions. 
3.  If literate in some basic science and economics, an adroit lawyer, on either 
side, might mount apparently reasonable challenges to any EPA decision 
about whether and how to regulate arsenic in drinking water. An industry 
lawyer should be able to urge, with some force, that any new regulation of 
arsenic is too severe, because the costs exceed the benefits. An 
environmental lawyer should be able to urge, with some force, that nearly 
                                                 
17 This point is also pressed in Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 
Yale L.J. 1981 (1998). 
18 Toxicology 1145 (Hans Marquardt et al. eds., 1999).  
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any imaginable regulation of arsenic is too lenient, because the benefits of 
further regulation would exceed the costs. Both challenges would be 
plausible for a simple reason: It is easy to identify assumptions that would 
drive the numbers up or down. Hence one of my principal goals is to 
provide a kind of primer on how informed lawyers can integrate science, 
economics, and law in order to challenge regulatory outcomes. 
4.  In part because of point 3, and in light of an understanding of the scientific 
and economic complexities, courts should play an exceedingly deferential 
role in overseeing CBA at the agency level.  To say the least, judges are not 
specialists in the relevant topics, some of which are highly technical, and 
because good lawyers will be able to raise so many plausible doubts, the 
best judicial posture is one of deference. In the arsenic case, and in many 
other contexts, agencies must decide in the midst of considerable scientific 
uncertainty and on the basis of judgments of value on which reasonable 
people can differ. If agencies have been both open and reasonable, the 
judicial role is at an end. It follows, for example, that the Clinton 
Administration’s arsenic rule, if it had been finally issued and challenged, 
should have survived judicial review. It also follows that a much less 
stringent regulation, if chosen by the Bush Administration, should survive 
judicial review too. The claim for judicial deference, in both cases, is 
rooted in institutional considerations, and above all a sense of the likely 
problems of intensive judicial review – not in approval of any particular 
agency decision.  
5.  The false precision of CBA is a significant cautionary note, but it should 
not be taken as a fundamental attack on the method itself, at least if CBA 
is understood as a way of compiling relevant information. In the arsenic 
case, an assessment of costs and benefits cannot determine the outcome. 
But even so, the assessment is indispensable to inform the inquiry and to 
ensure that discretion is exercised  in a way that is transparent rather than 
opaque. Without some effort to ascertain the effects of regulation, agencies 
are making a stab in the dark. At the very least, an understanding of the 
data helps show exactly why the decision about how to regulate arsenic is 
genuinely difficult – and why, and where, reasonable people might differ. 
This is itself a significant gain.  
6.  The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), designed to control pollution in 
drinking water, has been amended to require cost-benefit balancing, 
partly in order to permit the EPA to relax regulatory requirements where 
the benefits are low and the costs are high.19 At the same time, however, 
                                                 
19 42 USC § 300f et seq. (Safe Drinking Water Act).  
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the SDWA continues to have a high degree of rigidity. The EPA is not 
authorized to impose regulation selectively and in those areas in which 
regulation would do the most good; it is required to proceed with a 
uniform, national regulation. The EPA is also forbidden to create trading 
programs, which might well make best sense for some pollutants. 
Statutory amendments would be sensible here, especially under a statute 
dedicated to cost-benefit balancing. Regulatory statutes generally should 
authorize agencies to target regulations to areas where the benefits exceed 
the costs, and should also allow agencies to use market incentives where 
appropriate.  
7.  It would be extremely valuable to assemble information about the 
distributional consequences of regulation. The benefits of some 
regulations are enjoyed disproportionately by people who are poor and 
members of minority groups.20 The burdens of some regulations are 
imposed disproportionately on exactly the same groups. To assess the 
arsenic rule, it would be highly desirable to know whether poor people 
are mostly helped or mostly hurt. Would they bear high costs? Would the 
regulation operate as a regressive tax? Unfortunately, the EPA has not 
answered that question, though it would almost certainly be easy for it to 
do so. My own preliminary analysis suggests that the most significant 
financial burdens would be imposed on people with annual incomes well 
below the median21 -- a point that is certainly relevant to overall 
evaluation. Existing Executive Orders, calling for CBA, should be 
amended to require a careful distributional analysis as well.22 
 
This Article comes in several parts. Part I offers a general overview of the 
movement toward cost-benefit balancing, a movement for which the SWDA 
stands as the most dramatic legislative endorsement. It also gives a brief 
description of the public outcry over President Bush’s decision to suspend the 
regulation, in a way that is intended to fortify the case for CBA. Part II provides a 
brief outline of the SDWA and of the EPA’s rationale in its regulation of arsenic. 
Part III explores the very different analysis coming from the American Enterprise 
Institute-Brookings Joint Center on Regulation. Part IV, in many ways the heart 
                                                 
20See Matthew E. Kahn., The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 Regulation 22 
(2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=267073. 
21See note infra. 
22See note supra. There is a brief reference  to “distributive impacts” in Executive Order 12966. 
See also Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses, 164–70 
(2000) (discussing need to explore equitable and distributional considerations, including effects 
on poor and minority communities).  
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of the Article, shows how apparently reasonable assumptions lead to a 
dramatically diverse set of benefit numbers, both monetized and nonmonetized. 
Part V explores how lawyers and courts might respond to the existing data.  Part 
VI discusses the role of policymakers, explaining that agencies should be 
permitted to issue targeted regulations and to use economic incentives, and that 
in keeping with its informational functions, CBA should include a description of 
the expected winners and losers from regulation. 
 
1.  Intuitive Toxicology and the Cost-Benefit State 
 
      A. Arsenic and the Public 
 
My principal topic will be the contest over the appropriate analysis of 
existing data relating to arsenic; but it will be useful to begin with a puzzle. In 
April 2001, the Bush Administration suspended the Clinton Administration’s 
arsenic regulation , calling for further study.23 There seems to be little question 
that of all the controversial environmental actions of the Bush Administration, 
the suspension of the arsenic rule produced the most intense reaction.  
 
A national survey, conducted between April 21 and April 26, 1001, found 
that 56% of Americans rejected the Bush decision, whereas only 34% approved of 
it – and that majorities of Americans opposed the decision in every region of the 
nation.24 At various points, the public outcry combined concern, certainty, and 
cynicism. “Arsenic everywhere, and Bush is not helping,” according to one 
newspaper.25 “You may have voted for him, but you didn’t vote for this in your 
water,” wrote the Wall Street Journal.26 I n  a n  e d i t o r i a l ,  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  T i m e s  
demanded that “Americans should expect their drinking water to be at least as 
safe as that of Japan, Jordan, Namibia and Laos,” all of which impose a 10 ppb 
standard.27 A respected journalist asked, “How callous can you get, Mr. 
Compassionate Conservative?”28 Ridiculing the Bush Administration in a cartoon 
                                                 
23See 66 Fed. Reg. 16,134 (2001) (delaying arsenic rule); 66 Fed. Reg. 20,579 (2001) (ordering 
subsequent process) 
24Mark Barabak, Bush Criticized as Fear of Environment Grows, LA Times, April 20, 1001, 
available at latimes.com/news/timespoll/national/lat_poll010430.htm. 
25Erik Olson, Arsenic Everywhere, and Bush Is Not Helping, Balt. Sun, May 14, 2001, 9A. 
26John Fialka, Arsenic and Wild Space: Green Activists from across Spectrum Unite Against 
Bush, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 2001, A20. 
27Robert K. Musil, Arsenic on Tap, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2001, A18. 
28Michael Kinsley, Bush Decision on Arsenic Tough to Swallow, Times Union, Apr. 16, 2001, 
A9.  
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entitled, “Safety is for Sissies,” Time Magazine epitomized public sentiment by 
targeting the arsenic decision as a chief example of several environmental 
foibles.29 The public reaction came to a head during the legislative debates on the 
issue, particularly within the House of Representatives, which voted to reinstate 
the Clinton rule on the theory that arsenic “is a poison.”30 
 
Here is the puzzle. With respect to arsenic, the underlying issues are 
highly technical, and very few people are expert on the risks posed by exposure 
to low levels of arsenic. What accounts for the public outcry? 
 
I believe that the reason is simple: Arsenic was involved, and so was 
drinking water. These two facts made the controversy seem highly accessible,  
and it seemed easy to be outraged. Why was the Bush Administration allowing 
dangerously high levels of arsenic to remain in drinking water? This appeared to 
be a rhetorical question. By contrast, many environmental problems are both 
obscure and technical, and people do not have an easy or intuitive handle on 
them. Is carbon dioxide a serious problem? Most people have no idea. But 
arsenic is well-known, and it is well-known to be a poison, not least because of 
the exceedingly popular movie, Arsenic and Old Lace. In fact an influential 
environmental group, the Natural Resources Defense Council, has exploited 
exactly this reference with its work on the arsenic problem, under the title, 
Arsenic and Old Laws.31  
 
Ordinary people seem to be “intuitive toxicologists,” with a set of simple 
rules for thinking about environmental risks.32 Among those simple rules is a 
belief that substances that cause cancer are unsafe, and should be banned.33 That 
intuitive toxicology does not easily make room for issues of degree. It does not 
accommodate the judgment that low levels of admittedly carcinogenic 
substances should sometimes be tolerated, because the risks are low and the 
costs of eliminating them are high. It does not show an understanding of the 
                                                 
29Bruce Handy & Glynis Sweeny, Safety is for Sissies, Time, Apr. 16, 2001, 88. 
30Cong. Rec. H4751 (July 27, 2001). 
31Natural Resources Defense Council, Arsenic and Old Laws: A Scientific and Public Health 
Analysis of Arsenic Occurrence in Drinking Water, Its Health Effects, and EPA’s Outdated 
Arsenic Tap Water Standard (2001), available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/arsenic/ 
exesum.asp. 
32See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 285–93 (2000). 
33Id., p. 291.  
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different imaginable dose-response curves and the possibility of safe thresholds, 
or even benefits from low exposure levels.34  
As part of intuitive toxicology, people rely on the “affect heuristic,” 
through which their judgments about risks are greatly affected by rapid, even 
automatic responses.35 Consider, for example, the remarkable fact that stock 
prices increase significantly on sunny days, a fact that is hard to explain in terms 
that do not rely on affect.36 With respect to risks, people’s affect often operates as 
a kind of mental shortcut, substituting for a more careful inquiry into 
consequences.37 Something very much of this sort has happened with the Bush 
Administration’s suspension of the arsenic standard, partly because of 
skepticism about President Bush, but about all because of the associations of 
arsenic. “If there is one thing we all seem to agree on is that we do not want 
arsenic in our drinking water. It is an extremely potent human carcinogen. . . . It 
is this simple: Arsenic is a killer.”38 Indeed, we could easily imagine public 
outrage over any decision to allow arsenic in drinking water, even if the 
permissible level was exceedingly low. The outrage is likely to be promoted by 
cascade effects, in which people’s concern is heightened by the fact that other 
people are concerned. Indeed the Bush Administration’s suspension of the 
arsenic rule seems to have created a cascade effect, in which many people 
objected to the suspension because other (reasonable) people seemed to have 
objected.39 In fact one of the most compelling arguments, within the House of 
Representatives and the public at large, was that other countries regulated 
arsenic at the level of stringency proposed in the Clinton Administration.40 The 
practices of other countries seemed to operate as a kind of mental shortcut, 
showing what it is right to do – notwithstanding the reasonable questions that 
might be asked about the scientific bases for those practices.  
 
                                                 
34See infra. 
35See Slovic, supra note; see also Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, forthcoming. Related 
arguments can be found in the discussion of outrage in Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage 
and Erratic Awards, J. Risk & Uncertainty (1998), also in Cass R. Sunstein et al., PunitiveDamages: 
How Juries Decide (forthcoming 2002).  
36See David Hirschleifer and  Tyler Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the 
Weather , available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfm. 
37See Slovic, supra note. 
38Cong. Rec. H4744 (remarks of Rep. Waxman). 
39See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational 
Cascades in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathyrn Ierulli 
eds., 1995). 
40See, e.g., Cong. Rec. H4743 (July 27, 2001) (remarks of Rep. Bonior).  
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There is a deeper point here. The problems in intuitive toxicology, and the 
crudeness of the affect heuristic, seem strongly to support the use of CBA,41 
understood not at all as a way to stop regulation, but to ensure that when 
government acts, it does so with some understanding of the likely consequences. 
CBA might well be understood as a way of moving beyond “intuitive 
toxicology” toward a form of toxicology that is actually supported by the data. 
This point raises some much larger issues, involving significant trends in the 
nature of government regulation, to which I now turn. 
 
B. The Emerging Cost-Benefit State 
 
More than any other federal statute, the SWDA, as a result of amendments in 
1996, reflects a strong commitment to cost-benefit balancing. The rise of interest 
in cost-benefit balancing signals a dramatic shift from the initial stages of 
national risk regulation. Those stages  were undergirded by might be called 
“1970s environmentalism,” which placed a high premium on immediate 
responses to long-neglected problems, which emphasized the existence of 
problems rather than their magnitude, and which was often rooted in moral 
indignation directed at the behavior of those who created pollution and other 
risks to safety and health.42 Defining aspects of 1970s environmentalism can be 
found in the apparently cost-blind national ambient air quality provisions of the 
Clean Air Act43 and in statutory provisions requiring that standards be set by 
reference to the “the best available technology” without an assessment of either 
costs or benefits.44   
 
No one should deny that 1970s environmentalism has done an enormous 
amount of good, helping to produce dramatic improvements in many domains, 
above all in the context of air pollution, where ambient air quality has improved 
for all major pollutants.45 Indeed, 1970s environmentalism appears, by most 
accounts, to survive cost-benefit balancing, producing aggregate benefits in the 
                                                 
41 See Stephen Williams, Squaring the Vicious Circle, 53 Ad. L. Rev. 289 (2001). 
42 See Bruce Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 13 Colum. J. 
Envtl. L. 171 (1988). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). 
44 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.§ 1311(b)(1)(AA), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1), 7412(d)(2), 7475(a)(4), 7502(c)(1). 
45 See Economic Analyses at EPA 455-56 (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1998); Paul Portnoy, Air 
Pollution Policy in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 77, 101–5 (Paul Portnoy & Robert 
Stavins eds., 2000).  
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trillions of dollars, well in excess of the aggregate costs.46  But even though the 
overall picture is no cause for alarm, a closer look at federal regulatory policy 
shows a wide range of problems.  
 
Perhaps foremost is exceptionally poor priority-setting, with substantial 
resources sometimes going to small problems, and with little attention to some 
serious problems.47 According to one study, better allocations of health 
expenditures could save, each year, 60,000 additional lives at no additional cost – 
and such allocations could maintain the current level of lives saved with $31 
billion in annual savings.48 The point has been dramatized by repeated 
demonstrations that some regulations create significant substitute risks49 -- and 
that with cheaper,  more effective tools, regulation could achieve  its basic goals 
while saving billions of dollars.50 
 
In these circumstances, the most attractive parts of the movement for CBA 
have been rooted not in especially controversial judgments about what 
government ought to be doing, but instead in a more mundane search for 
pragmatic instruments designed to reduce the problems of poor priority-setting, 
excessively costly tools, and inattention to the unfortunate side-effects of 
regulation. By drawing attention to costs and benefits, it should be possible to 
spur the most obviously desirable regulations, to deter the most obviously 
undesirable ones, to encourage a broader view of consequences, and to promote 
a search for least-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals.51 Notice here that 
so defended, CBA is not only an obstacle to unjustified regulation; it should be a 
spur to government as well, showing that it should attend to neglected problems. 
If cost-benefit balancing is supported on these highly pragmatic grounds, the 
central question is whether that form of balancing is actually producing what can 
be taken as policy improvements by people with diverse views about 
appropriate policy.  
 
                                                 
46See Paul Portnoy, Air Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 77, 
101–5 (Paul Portnoy & Robert Stavins eds., 2000). 
47This is the theme of Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1995). 
48Tammy Tengs et al., Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 
15 Risk Analysis 369 (1995). 
49See John Graham & Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1995). 
50See, e.g., A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets in Clean Air (2000); Robert Stavins, Market-Based 
Environmental Policies, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection, supra note 15, pps.31, 35–
55. 
51For many examples, see Economic Analysis at EPA (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1996).  
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On these counts, the record of CBA, at least within the EPA, is generally 
encouraging.52 Assessments of costs and benefits has, for example,  helped 
produce more stringent and rapid regulation of lead in gasoline; promoted more 
stringent regulation of lead in drinking water;  led to stronger controls on air 
pollution at the Grand Canyon and the Navaho Generating Station; and 
produced a reformulated gasoline rule that promotes stronger controls on air 
pollutants.53 In these areas, CBA, far from being only a check on regulation, has 
indeed spurred governmental  attention to serious problems.  
 
CBA has also led to regulations that accomplish statutory goals at lower cost, 
or that do not devote limited private and public resources to areas where they 
are unlikely to do much good. With respect to asbestos, for example, an analysis 
of benefits and costs led the EPA to tie the phase-down schedules to the costs of 
substitutes, and also to exempt certain products from a flat ban.54 With respect to 
lead in gasoline and control of CFCs (destructive of the ozone layer), CBA helped 
promote the use of economic incentives rather than command-and-control 
regulation;55 economic incentives are much cheaper and make more stringent 
regulation possible in the first place. For regulation of sludge, protection of 
farmworkers, water  pollution regulation for the Great Lakes, and controls on 
organic chemicals, CBA helped regulators produce modifications that 
significantly reduced costs.56 For modern government, one of the most serious 
problems appears to be, not agency use of CBA, but frequent noncompliance 
with executive branch requirements that agencies engage in such analysis.57 
 
Of course CBA is hardly uncontroversial.58 Insofar as both costs and benefits 
are being measured by the economic criterion of “private willingness to pay,” 
there are many problems. Poor people often have little ability and hence little 
willingness to pay; some people will be inadequately informed, and hence show 
unwillingness to pay for benefits that would make their lives go better59; and 
perhaps regulatory agencies should seek, not private willingness to pay, but 
                                                 
52Id. 
53Id. p. 458. 
54Id. p. 458. 
55Id. p 49–86; 131–69. 
56Id. p. 458. 
57See Hahn, supra note  
58For a general challenge to quantification, see Heinzerling, supra note 9. 
59See Adler & Posner, supra note 6.  
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public judgments, as expressed in public arenas.60  Society is not best taken as 
some maximizing machine, in which aggregate  output is all that matters. 
Sometimes a regulation producing $5 million in benefits but $6 million in costs 
will be worthwhile, if those who bear the costs (perhaps representing dollar 
losses alone?) can do so easily, and if those who receive the benefits (perhaps 
representing lives and illnesses averted?)  are especially needy. 
 
In view of these problems, the strongest arguments for cost-benefit balancing 
are based, not only or even mostly on neoclassical economics, but also on an 
understanding of human cognition, on democratic considerations, and on an 
assessment of the real-world record of such balancing.61  All of these points are 
directly relevant to the arsenic controversy. Begin with cognition: Ordinary 
people have difficulty in calculating probabilities, and they tend to rely on rules 
of thumb, or heuristics, that can lead them to make systematic errors.62  CBA is a 
natural corrective  here. Because of intense emotional reactions to particular 
incidents, people often make mistakes in thinking about the seriousness of 
certain risks.63 Cost-benefit balancing should help government resist demands for 
regulation that are rooted in misperceptions of facts. Unless people are asked to 
seek a full accounting,  they are likely to focus on small parts of problems, 
producing inadequate  or even counterproductive  solutions. 64 CBA is a way of 
producing that full accounting.  
 
With respect to democracy, the case for CBA is strengthened by the fact that 
interest-groups are often able to use these cognitive problems strategically,  thus 
fending off regulation that is desirable, or pressing for regulation when the 
argument on its behalf is fragile.65 Here CBA, taken as an input into decisions, 
can protect democratic processes by exposing an account of consequences to 
public view.   With respect to pragmatic considerations, a review of the record 
                                                 
60Many of these points are pressed in Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 
(1993). 
61I attempt to develop this point in Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. 
Legal Stud. 1059 (2000). In the same vein, see Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in Values At Risk 94–
112 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986). 
62Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos 
Tversky eds., 1982); Roger Noll & James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for 
Risk Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990). 
63See George Loewenstein et al., Risk As Feelings (forthcoming 2001). 
64See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (1994). 
65See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. 
Rev. 683 (1999).  
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suggests that cost-benefit balancing leads to improvements, not on any 
controversial view of how to value the goods at stake, but simply because such 
balancing leads to more stringent regulation of serious problems, less costly 
ways of achieving regulatory goals, and a reduction in expenditures for 
problems that are, by any account, relatively minor.66 All of these points help 
explain the content of the SDWA, as we shall now see. 
 
II.  Drinking Water: Congress and EPA 
 
      A. Statutory Background 
 
Regulatory statutes typically require agencies to require as much as 
“feasible,”  67 or to “protect the public health.” 68 Only a few such statutes 
expressly require agency decisions to turn on cost-benefit balancing.69  T h e  
SDWA is an intriguing hybrid, combining an analysis of public health and 
feasibility with reference to CBA as well. Indeed, the cost-benefit provisions of 
SDWA go as far as any other federal statute in requiring close attention to costs 
and benefits; and because Congress has been quite interested in imposing more 
general cost-benefit requirements,70 the SDWA might well be a harbinger of the 
future. For that reason alone, the implementation of the statute is worth careful 
attention. 
 
More particularly, the SDWA asks the EPA to proceed in three steps. First, 
the EPA is asked to set “maximum contaminant level goals” for water 
pollutants.71 The goals must be set “at the level at which no known or anticipated 
adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an adequate 
margin of safety.” In practice, this statutory standard will frequently call for a 
MCLG of 0, because many contaminants cannot be shown to have safe 
thresholds, and because the “adequate margin of safety” language will, in these 
specific circumstances, seem to support a 0 MCLG.72 Second, the EPA is told to 
                                                 
66See Economic Analysis at EPA 455-76. 
67See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (“feasible”); 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (A)(3)(A) (“will be available”); 42 
U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (“achievable”); 42 U.S.C. § 6411(a)(1) (“has been adequately demonstrated”). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). 
69 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (Toxic Substances Control Act); 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. 
(Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act). 
70 See the overview in Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and  Social Justice (1997). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A). 
72 See 56 Fed. Reg. 26,460 (1991) (establishing a level of 0 for lead); 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 
2001) (establishing a goal of 0 for arsenic).  
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specify “a maximum contaminant level . . . which is as close to the maximum 
contaminant level goal as is feasible.”73 The statute defines feasible (not terribly 
helpfully) to mean “feasible with the use of the best technology, treatment 
techniques, and other means which” the EPA finds “are available.”74 Third, the 
EPA is required to undertake a risk assessment for pollutants, discussing the 
level of the danger and the costs of achieving the requisite reduction.75 The risk 
assessment is supposed to give an account, for the MCL being considered and for 
all alternatives levels being considered, of the “quantifiable and nonquantifiable 
health risk reduction benefits for which there is a factual basis in the rulemaking 
record”;  the quantifiable and nonquantifiable costs; the “incremental costs and 
benefits associated with each alternative”; and  any increased health risk that 
may occur from compliance, “including risks associated with co-occurring 
contaminants”76  
 
The risk assessment is no mere disclosure provision. The EPA is expressly 
permitted (not required) to set a maximum contaminant level at a level other 
than the feasible level if it determines that the benefits of that level “would not 
justify the costs of complying with the level.”77 On the basis of that 
determination, the EPA is permitted to set a maximum level “that maximizes 
health risk reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefits.”78 Courts 
are authorized to review the EPA’s judgment about whether the benefits of a 
certain level justify the costs, but only by asking whether that judgment is 
“arbitrary and capricious.”79 
 
What does all this mean? SWDA is quite different from the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, which expressly requires the EPA to base decisions on a 
simple comparison of costs and benefits.80 S W D A  i s  m o r e  i n d i r e c t ,  e v e n  
circuitous, in its endorsement of cost-benefit requirements. But the difference 
between SWDA and TSCA is more apparent than real. In regulating 
contaminants in drinking water, the EPA is required to show that its judgment 
about cost-benefit balancing is not “arbitrary,” and this standard is essentially 
                                                 
7342 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B). 
7442 U.S.C. § 300g-1(4)D). 
7542 U.S.C. § 300g-1(3). 
7642 U.S.C. § 300g-1(3)(C)(I)(VI). 
7742 U.S.C. § 300g-1(6) (A). 
7842 U.S.C. § 300g-1(6) (A). 
7942 U.S.C. § 300g-1(6)(D). 
80See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq ; see also Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 
1991).  
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the same as applied under TSCA.81 Perhaps SWDA gives the EPA somewhat 
more room for the exercise of discretion. But at most, the difference is one of 
degree. It is clear that courts are authorized to invalidate an arbitrary or 
unreasoned assessment, on the cost or benefit side, or on the question whether 
the benefits justify the costs. As we shall see, this point raises many questions for 
the future. 
 
      B. Arsenic and the Federal Government 
 
  Arsenic is commonly found in nature, as the mineral compound 
“arsenopyrite.” As a result of soil and rock erosion, it is released into the water 
supply, where it can be found in many regions, including New England, eastern 
Michigan, and the southwest United States.  It has long been known that arsenic 
can be toxic,82  even carcinogenic,83 and since 1942, the EPA has had in place an 
arsenic regulation calling for an MCL of 50 ppb per liter. But in the past decades, 
some evidence suggests arsenic may have significant adverse effects at levels 
well below the 50 ppb standard. The principal evidence comes from 
epidemiological studies in Chile, Argentina, and above all Taiwan, finding that 
exposure levels of 300-600 ppb cause significant increases of various cancers and 
other adverse effects.84 
 
In 1996, Congress directed EPA to propose a new standard for arsenic by 
January 1, 2000.85 At the same time, Congress told the National Academy of 
Sciences and EPA to study the health effects of arsenic in order to assist the 
rulemaking effort.86 In 1996, the EPA requested that the National Research 
Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences conduct an independent 
review of arsenic toxicity data and recommend changes to EPA’s arsenic criteria. 
In its 1999 report, the NRC located few studies which examined arsenic effects at 
low-level concentrations and even fewer studies in agreement.87 A 1995 Japanese 
study found cancer mortality near or below expectation among persons exposed 
                                                 
81See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991). 
82For recent overviews, see Morales et al., Risk of Internal Cancers from Arsenic in Drinking 
Water, 108 Environ. Health Persp. 655 (2000). 
83See NRC, Arsenic in Drinking Water, supra note 83. 
84See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7001-7003. 
8542 USC 300g–1(b)(12)(A). 
86Id 301g-1(b)(13)(B)(I). 
87Nat’l Research Council, Arsenic in Drinking Water, at 83–130 (1999), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309063337/html.  
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to arsenic in drinking water at less than 50 ppb per liter.88 Domestic research in 
the same year revealed no association between bladder-cancer risk and arsenic 
exposure, where 81 of 88 Utah towns (92%) had concentrations below 10 ppb, 
and only one town exceeded the 50 ppb standard.89 A 1999 assessment of Utah 
mortality rates, which the EPA described as “the best U.S. study currently 
available,” found no increased bladder or lung cancer risks after exposure to 
arsenic levels of 14 to 166 ppb per liter.90 More recent studies in Finland and 
Taiwan, however, linked increased risks of bladder cancer and cerebrovascular 
disease to groundwater arsenic consumption as low as 0.1 to 50 ppb.91 The 
Taiwan study, with its significant population base, seemed especially 
impressive.92 
 
These results could have led the NRC in several different directions. It 
would not have been entirely astonishing for the NRC to find that the evidence 
was too inconclusive to support a new rule. Nonetheless, the NRC concluded 
that the Taiwan studies, examining larger doses, provided the best available 
evidence on human health effects of arsenic. NRC used linear extrapolations 
from these data to obtain cancer risks at exposure levels below 50 ppb per liter, 
and subsequently recommended the EPA significantly lower its current 
standard.93 Indeed, the NRC concluded that “considering the data on bladder 
and lung cancer noted in the studies . . . a similar approach for all cancers could 
easily result in a combined cancer risk on the order of 1 in 100” from exposure at 
50 ppb.94 The 1 in 100 risk figure is a special source of concern, because EPA is 
usually attentive to environmental risks at or below 1 in 1,000,000.95   
 
                                                 
88T. Tsuda, et al., Ingested Arsenic and Internal Cancer: A Historical Cohort Study Followed 
for 33 Years, 141 Am. J. Epidemiol. 198 (1995). See also Nat’l Research Council, supra note 1, at 99 
(finding results statistically unstable). 
89M.N. Bates, A.H. Smith, & K.P. Cantor, Case-Control Study of Bladder Cancer and Arsenic in 
Drinking Water, 141 Am. J. Epidemiol. 523 (1995). 
90The EPA discounted these results in its final MCL report, based upon the already low cancer 
rates of the subject population when compared to the entire state. 66 Fed. Reg. at 7004; D.R. 
Lewis, et al., Drinking Water Arsenic in Utah: A Cohort Mortality Study, 107(5) Envtl. Health 
Perspectives 359 (1999). 
91P. Kurttio et al., Arsenic Concentrations in Well Water and Risk of Bladder and Kidney 
Cancer in Finland, 107(9) Envtl. Health Perspectives 705 (1999); H.Y. Chiou et al., Arsenic 
Methylation Capacity, Body Retention, and Null Genotypes of Glutathione S-transferase M1 and 
T1 Among Current Arsenic-Exposed Residents in Taiwan, 386 Mutat. Res. 197 (1997). 
92Nat’l Research Council, supra note 59, at 17. 
93Nat’l Research Council, supra note 59, at 8–9. 
94Abt Associates, Inc., Arsenic in Drinking Rule Economic Analysis 1–1 (2000). 
95See Robert Percival et al., Environmental 442 (3d ed. 2000).  
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Critics attacked the recommendation on the grounds that Taiwanese 
cooking and health practices put citizens at greater risk for arsenic toxicity than 
Americans, as demonstrated by the absence of a single report of U.S. arsenic-
induced cancer.96 The Tawainese population is much poorer than the American 
population, suffering from a number of dietary and nutritional deficiencies, 
including a higher intact of arsenic from food, and a deficiency in selenium, zinc, 
and vitamin B12, all of which can reduce the toxicity of arsenic. In fact, animal 
studies even suggest that arsenic may be a nutritional requirement, though there 
is insufficient data to indicate any nutritional role in human health.97 Despite 
these criticisms, the EPA relied heavily upon the NRC’s scientific conclusions 
when redeveloping its current MCL. 
 
In 2000, the EPA issued a proposed regulation, setting an MCLG of 0 parts 
per billion (ppb), because no safe level could be identified; an MCL of 3 ppb, on 
the ground that this was the lowest feasible level; and regulatory ceiling of 5 ppb, 
on the ground that the CBA justified this approach, but not any more stringent 
mandate.98 It also requested comments on regulatory ceilings of three, ten, and 
twenty ppb, for which it provided accounts of both benefits and costs. On 
January 22, 2001, the EPA issued a final rule, essentially embodying the same 
analysis as the proposal, but with a crucial change, to a regulatory ceiling of 10 
ppb rather than 5.99 The EPA urged that its assessment of costs and benefits, for 
four different levels of stringency, justified the 10 ppb  level. The rule was to 
become effective on March 23, 2001, with a compliance date of January 23, 
2006.100 
 
1. Costs. The new regulation would have required several thousand water 
systems, serving about 10 million people, to install new equipment. The overall 
cost of the 10 ppb standard would have been about $210 million.101 But the 
aggregate figure is not entirely informative; across the nation, the additional 
payments would vary considerably. For most households, the annual increase in 
water bills would be in the range of $30.102 But water systems with 500 or fewer 
customers would face significantly higher costs, ranging up to $325 per 
                                                 
96See Sue E. Umshler, When Arsenic is Safer in Your Cup of Tea Than in Your Local Water 
Treatment Plant, 39 Nat. Resources J. 565, 589-592 (1999). See also 66 Fed. Reg. pps. 7003–4. 
97Id. p. 587. 
9865 Fed. Reg. 38,888 (2000). 
9966 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001). 
100Id. 
10166 Fed. Reg. p. 7010. 
10266 Fed. Reg. p. 7011.  
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household. These water systems represent a small fraction of the total number of 
people affected by arsenic; they tend to involve rural communities.   
 
As it was required to do, the EPA also calculated the costs of alternative 
levels of regulation. A 20 ppb standard would cost about $70 million; a 5 ppb 
standard, $440 million; and a 3 ppb standard, $720 million. Here too the 
disaggregated  figures are important. The most stringent standard, of 3 ppb, 
would cost an average of $41 per affected household; the 20 ppb standard would 
cost about an average of  $24. At the high end, the 20 ppb standard is actually 
more expensive (at $350) than the 2 ppb standard ($317), because of the 
particular control technologies that would be involved. Consider the following 
summary: 
 
Table 1 
MEAN ANNUAL COSTS PER HOUSEHOLD 
(in 1999 dollars) 
System Size  3ppb  5ppb  10ppb  20ppb 
less than 100  $317  $318.26  $326.82  $351.15 
100–500  166.91 164.02 162.50 166.72 
501–1000 74.81 73.11 70.72 68.24 
1001–3300 63.76 61.94 58.24 54.36 
3301–10,000  42.84 40.18 37.71 34.63 
10,001–50,000  38.40 36.07 32.37 29.05 
50,001–100,000  31.63 29.45 24.81 22.64 
100,001–1,000,000  25.29 23.34 20.52 19.26 
More  than  1,000,000  7.41 2.79 0.86 0.15 
All  Categories  41.34 36.95 31.85 23.95 
 
 
EPA did not offer a population-wide breakdown, to show the numbers of 
people served by the various system sizes, and to see whether the people who 
would bear the costs could do so easily or with difficulty. But one analysis, 
admittedly from a group with a particular point of view, suggests that almost 9 
out of 10 people (87%) who consume arsenic at a significant level in their tap 
water (over 1 ppb) are served by systems serving more than 10,000 customers.103 
                                                 
103Natural Resources Defense Council, Arsenic and Old Laws: A Scientific and Public Health 
Analysis of Arsenic Occurrence in Drinking Water, Its Health Effects, and EPA’s Outdated 
Arsenic Tap Water Standard, ch. 3, p. 5 (2001), available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/ 
arsenic/exesum.asp.  
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This means that 87% of the people who will have to pay for water technology 
would face annual increases of less than $30 – not trivial, perhaps, but certainly 
not a huge expenditure.  
 
2. Benefits. Within the EPA, the much harder issues involved the benefits 
of the 10 ppb requirement. The most easily quantified benefits involve prevented 
cases of bladder and lung cancer;  here the epidemiological data, mostly from 
Taiwan, allowed quantitative estimates to be made. For two reasons, however, 
even these estimates should be taken with many grains of salt. The first reason is 
that there are differences, noted above, between the population of Taiwan and 
that of the United States. The second reason is that a great deal turns on the 
nature of the dose-response curve. If the curve is “linear,” meaning that cancer 
cases do not drop sharply at low exposure levels, many more cancers will be 
predicted than if the curve is “sublinear,” meaning that after exposure declines to 
a certain level, the number of cancer cases drops off. Lacking any data on the 
question, the EPA decided to assume that the dose-response curve is linear, 
noting that “the use of a linear procedure to extrapolate from a higher, observed 
data range to a lower range beyond observation is a science policy approach that 
has been in use by Federal agencies for four decades.”104 The EPA added that the 
policy objectives are to avoid underestimating risk in order to protect public 
health and be consistent across risk assessments.105 From these remarks, it seems 
clear that the default assumption of linearity is not based on science, which 
cannot produce a standard default assumption, but on a policy judgment, 
designed to err on the side of protecting health by ensuring against 
underestimation of the risks. I will return to this important issue below.106 
 
Armed with the assumption of linearity, the EPA thought that estimates 
were feasible for bladder and lung cancers. The EPA calculated bladder and lung 
                                                 
104 66 Fed. Reg. at 7004. In selecting its dose-response model, the EPA examined a 2000 study 
by Morales which presented ten potential dose-response models based upon interpretations of 
the original Taiwan data. Morales, et al., Risk of Internal Cancers from Arsenic in Drinking 
Water, 108 Envtl. Health Perspectives 655 (2000). The EPA rejected those models with a comparison 
population, because these resulted in supralinear dose-response relationships (higher than a 
linear response). The EPA concluded that there was no basis for this type of relationship, since 
the NRC report had concluded that the dose-response relationship for arsenic at low levels 
should be either linear or sublinear, with a preference for the latter. 66 Fed. Reg. at 7006. The EPA 
then chose a linear model based upon the above-mentioned policies. These various points are 
treated in detail below. 
105 Id. 
106 See below.  
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cancer risks/benefits using the analysis of the NRC.107 The NRC used the Taiwan 
data to calculate a 1 to 1.5 per 1000 lifetime risk of male fatal bladder cancer at 
the current 50 ppb standard; it also examined the Chile and Argentina studies 
and concluded the rates of cancer were comparable to the Taiwan data. The EPA 
assessed lung cancer risks, which are known to be about 2.5 times greater than 
bladder cancer risks.  But for many of the health effects from arsenic, the EPA 
concluded that quantification was impossible. 
 
1. Lives and health: quantities. The EPA estimated that the 10 ppb 
requirement would prevent 21-29 cancer deaths and 16-26 cases of 
curable cancer.108 By comparison, a 20 ppb requirement would prevent 
11 deaths and 9 curable cancers; a 5 ppb requirement, 20-54 deaths and 
22-47 curable cancers; and a 3 ppb requirement, 32-74 cancer deaths 
and 24-64 curable cancers. Consider the following table: 
 
Table 2 
Annual Total (Bladder and Lung) Cancer Cases Avoided 
Arsenic Level  Reduced Mortality 
Cases 
Reduced Morbidity 
Cases 
Total Cancer Cases 
Avoided 
3 32.6–74.1  24.6–64.2  57.2–138.3 
5 29.1–53.7  22.0–46.5  51.1–100.2 
10 21.3–29.8  16.1–25.9  37.4–55.7 
20 10.2–11.3  8.5–8.8  19.0–19.8 
 
 
2.  Lives and health: no quantities. The EPA also concluded that the 10 
ppb standard would produce “important non-quantified benefits.” 
“Chief among these are certain health effects known to be caused by 
arsenic, though, while they may be substantial, the extent to which 
these impacts occur at levels below 50 [ppb] is unknown.”  
 
The relevant effects include several kinds of cancer: skin, kidney, liver, 
prostate, and nasal passages. They also include pulmonary effects, 
cardiovascular effects, immunological effects, neurological effects, and 
endocrine effects. To this the EPA added that there would be other 
benefits that would defy quantification. Among these is “the effect on 
those systems that install treatment technologies that can affect multiple 
contaminants.” Some of the technologies that would reduce arsenic levels 
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would also remove “many other contaminants that EPA is in the process 
of regulating or considering regulating.”  
 
3.  Converting quantities to dollars. To compare the quantified benefits of 
regulation with the $200 million cost, EPA was required to engage in 
several exercises in conversion. With respect to lives saved, the EPA 
used a value of a statistical life of $6.1 million.109 T h a t  f i g u r e  w a s  
derived by calculating the average of over two dozen studies, mostly 
in the 1970s, generally designed to show how much an employer had 
to pay employees to compensate for a statistical risk of death. By 
multiplying the number of expected mortalities by $6.1 million, EPA 
obtained most of the “dollar value” of the arsenic regulation. 
 
As noted, however, many of the cancers caused by arsenic are not fatal. 
For a nonfatal cancer, the EPA used a figure of $607,000.110 This figure 
does not actually come from measurements of people’s willingness to pay 
to reduce a statistical risk of cancer, but instead from shoppers’ responses 
to hypothetical questions about how much they would be willing to pay 
to reduce a statistical risk of chronic bronchitis. Apparently the EPA 
thought that this was the closest available analogue to a nonfatal cancer. 
 
This, then, was the EPA’s basic analysis, captured in the following table: 
 
Table 3 
Estimated Benefits from Reducing Arsenic in Drinking Water 
($ millions 1999) 
Arsenic Level  Total Quantified Health Benefits, 
in Millions (Lower and Upper 
Bounds) 
Potential Nonquantified Health 
Benefits (Applies to All Levels) 
3  $213.8$490.9  Skin cancer, kidney cancer 
5  $191.1–$$3556  Cancer of nasal passages, liver 
cancer 
10  $139.6–$197.7  Prostate cancer, cardio-vascular 
effects 
20 $66.2–$75.3  Pulmonary,  neurological, 
endocrine effects 
 
 
                                                 
10966 Fed Reg at 7012. 
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It should be clear that the monetized costs of the 10 ppb standard are 
between $60 million and $2 million higher than the monetized benefits – and also 
that overall benefits are in line with overall costs only at the 20 ppb level.  EPA 
was well aware of this point. Nonetheless, it concluded that once the 
nonquantified benefits of the 10 ppb standard were included, the costs would be 
well justified. The cost per cancer case avoided for the final rule would be 
between $3.2 million and $4.8 million – hardly an extraordinary price to pay, and 
far lower than the $5 million to $12.2 million range produced by a 3 ppb 
standard.  
 
 
III.  Peer Review? Arsenic at AEI-Brookings 
  
The EPA’s conclusion was sharply disputed by a widely reported paper 
from the American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies.111 The authors, Jason Burnett and Robert Hahn, concluded that the costs 
of the rule would exceed  the benefits by about $190 million each year – and 
hence that the rule deserved membership in the Joint Center’s “$100 million 
club,” including regulations that cost at least $100 million more than they 
promise to deliver. For two reasons, the Burnett-Hahn study is worth close 
attention. First, the AEI-Brookings Joint Center is highly respected for its careful 
work on CBA, and Hahn is an especially able and influential observer of the 
regulatory process.112 Second, the disagreements between EPA and the Joint 
Center provide a great deal of information about the nature of CBA itself – and 
about the likely nature of legal challenges to such analysis by federal agencies. 
 
Burnett and Hahn raised no questions about EPA’s finding of a $200 
million cost to the arsenic rule. Instead, they made several key adjustments to the 
EPA’s calculation of benefits. The first set of adjustments involved the actual 
number of cancer cases to be prevented. The second set involved the translation 
of that figure into a dollar amount. 
 
To calculate cancer cases, Burnett and Hahn made two changes. First, they 
attempted to quantify the “nonquantifiable benefits” by multiplying EPA’s 
estimate of  twenty-eight lives saved by two, for a total of fifty-six. “Our 
                                                 
111See Jason K. Burnett & Robert W. Hahn, EPA’s Arsenic Rule: The Benefits of the Standard 
Do Not Justify the Costs, American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies, available at http://www.aei.brook.edu/publications/abstract.asp?pID=115 (Jan. 2001). 
112See, e.g., Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1997).  
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reasoning is that including ‘nonquantifiable risks’ would increase the lives-saved 
estimate by some factor between one and four.”113 This number came in turn 
from the report of the National Research Council, which suggests that the risk of 
death from all kinds of cancer might be eight times the risk of bladder cancers. 
Recognizing that EPA’s quantified figure represents both bladder and lung 
cancers, Burnett and Hahn took a multiple of four as producing a “reasonable 
upper bound” of 112; but fifty-six seemed more reasonable.  
 
Second, Burnett and Hahn divided their chosen number of fifty-six by 
five, to reflect their judgment that the risk of arsenic is not linearly related to 
arsenic concentrations. “This assumption is not realistic because the human body 
can metabolize arsenic at low levels, rendering it nontoxic.”114  (Note that the 
EPA concluded that recent research has drawn into doubt the claim that the 
metabolized forms of arsenic are any less toxic.)115 For Burnett and Hahn, the 
upshot is that the new regulation would save about eleven lives annually.  
 
To translate this amount into dollar terms, Burnett and Hahn adjusted the 
$6.1 million figure downward. They emphasized that cancer follows exposure to 
arsenic not immediately but only after a latency period, ranging from between 
ten and forty years. Burnett and Hahn use a 7% discount rate, on the theory that 
“future costs should be discounted just as future costs are.”116 As a result of the 
adjustment, the value of a statistical life fell to $1.1 million. Sharply disagreeing 
with the National Research Council and the EPA, with their projected risk of 1 in 
100, Burnett and Hahn added that “the risk reduction is about one in 1 million, 
which is so small as not to be worth addressing, given the uncertainties in the 
data and the EPA’s limited resources to develop regulations.”117 In fact Burnett 
and Hahn concluded that no plausible version of the arsenic proposal, going 
beyond the existing 50 ppb standard, could be justified on cost-benefit grounds. 
Here is their overview: 
                                                 
113 Burnett & Hahn, supra note 84, p. 7. 
114 Id. p. 5. 
115See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7000; H.V. Aposhian et al., Occurrence of Monomethylarsonous Acid in 
Urine of Humans Exposed to Inorganic Arsenic, 13 Chemical Research Toxicol. 693 (2000); J.S. 
Petrick et al., Monomethylarsonous Acid (MMAiii) Is More Toxic than Arsenite in Chang Liver 
Human Hepatocytes, 163 Toxicol. Appl. Pharmacol. 203 (2000). 
116Id. p. 8. 
117Id. p. 9.  
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Table 4 
AEI-Brookings Joint Center Estimates 
  Lives Saved  Benefits  Costs  Net Costs 
EPA’s Model without 
Accounting for Latency 
28  $170 million  $210 million  $40 million 
EPA’s Model Accounting 
for Latency 
28  $50 million  $210 million  $160 million 
Our High Estimate  110  $200 million  $210 million  $10 million 
Our best estimate  11  $23 million  $210 million  $190 million 
Our low estimate  5.5  $10 million  $210 million  $200 million 
 
 
Burnett and Hahn go further still. They urge that the arsenic regulation  is 
likely to produce a net loss in life, rather than a gain. The reason is that expensive 
regulations have been found to have mortality effects, in part because they make 
less money available for health care expenditures.118 According to a plausible 
estimate, a statistical life is lost for every $15 million expenditure, so that a 
regulation that costs $15 million per life saved results in no net mortality 
reduction.119 If this is correct, a regulation that costs $190 million on net is likely 
to result in a loss of over 10 lives, on balance, every year. This in fact is the 
Burnett-Hahn conclusion.120 
 
It is not clear if the Burnett-Hahn analysis influenced the actions of the 
Bush Administration, but the arsenic rule was delayed shortly after the 
election,121 and the EPA asked the National Academy of Sciences to produce an 
“expedited review” of the options between 3 ppb and 20 ppb. At the same time, 
the agency has sought new studies on both the cost and benefit sides.122 
 
IV. Questions and Doubts 
 
Many questions should be raised about the analysis by both EPA and 
Burnett and Hahn. The first set of questions involves the judgment about the 
                                                 
118Id. at. 2. 
119See Randall Lutter et al., The Cost-per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 
37 Econ. Inquiry 599 (1999). 
120Id. at. 9. 
12166 Fed. Reg., 16,134 (2001). 
12266 Fed. Reg 20,579 (1001) and EPA, EPA Administrator Whitman Establishes Process to 
Evaluate Arsenic in Driniing Wtaer Standard, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf.  
26   
likely benefits in terms of mortality and morbidity. The second set involves the 
translation of those benefits into dollar equivalents.  
 
My goal here is not to take sides on the disagreement between EPA on the 
one hand or Burnett and Hahn on the other. It is to suggest instead that the state 
of scientific knowledge is such as to justify only benefit ranges, not specific 
benefit numbers. This point might easily be taken as a challenge to CBA in 
general, and it is properly so taken if CBA is justified as a way of giving specific 
“bottom lines” to resolve hard cases. But if CBA is justified more modestly, as a 
way of getting a sense of the potential consequences of various courses of action, 
nothing I say here should be seen as a challenge to the basic method. Indeed, a 
virtue of CBA is that it helps to explain why the arsenic question is hard, not 
easy, and why competing judgments of value could lead in competing 
reasonable directions. I will say more about all this below. 
 
A. Life and Health Again 
       
1. The dose-response curve, in general and in particular. In calculating health 
effects, EPA assumed a linear dose-response curve for arsenic. In so doing, it 
followed its usual practice, which is to assume a linear, non-threshold model for 
Class A carcinogens in drinking water. In the EPA’s words, this is a 
“conservative mathematical model for cancer risk assessment. . . . It is consistent 
with a no-threshold model of carcinogenesis, i.e., exposure to even a very small 
amount of a substance is assumed to produce a finite increased risk of cancer.”123 
Note in this regard that the EPA’s Science Advisory Board, which consisted of 
prominent scientists who issued a report advising the agency, also recommended 
linear extrapolation based  upon the Taiwan data.124   
 
But Burnett and Hahn are correct to urge that this was not an inevitable 
decision. It is quite possible that at low levels, the effects of arsenic dwindle. 
“There is no strict rule with respect to the shape of the dose-response curve. “125 
To summarize what will be a lengthy and somewhat technical discussion: On the 
basis of what is known about carcinogens generally, the best scientific judgment 
seems to be that the dose-response curve for arsenic is sublinear. But this is a 
speculative judgment, not based on direct evidence, and we certainly do not 
know how sublinear the dose-response curve is, if indeed it is sublinear. 
                                                 
12340 CFR Pt. 132, App. C (West 2001). 
124See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7003, 7005. 
125Toxicology 1164 (Hans Marquardt et. al eds., 1999).  
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There are many complexities here, for dose-response curves come in many 
shapes and sizes. “It has long been recognized that a number of different 
mathematical models can fit a given set of dose-response data reasonably well, 
but produce vastly different predictions of risk when extrapolated to doses 
below the data range.  Thus, extrapolated doses corresponding to ‘de minimis’ 
risk levels can differ by several orders of magnitude, depending on the shape of 
the dose-response curve at low doses.”126  Often there is no evidence about the 
relationship between adverse effects and low doses, and hence a great deal of 
guesswork is involved. An overview suggests that a “number of models have 
been proposed, and there is active debate on which of these is most appropriate. 
One that is widely used by regulatory agencies because it is ‘conservative’ is a 
linear no-threshold extrapolation. As noted, proof has not been provided for any 
carcinogen that no threshold exists, and in fact, thresholds have been observed in 
many studies, particularly with weak carcinogens. The assumption of linearity at 
low doses is also not well founded. Indeed, even for the less complicated process 
of chemical mutagenesis in vivo, a drop below linearity at low doses has been 
demonstrated. Therefore, a ‘hockey stick’-shaped curve would appear to best fit 
current data and concepts on carcinogenic mechanisms at low levels of 
exposure.”127 Here are the basic possibilities (see the appendix for details): 
 
a. Supralinearity. For some forms of radiation, the curve is actually 
“supralinear,” in the sense that with lower doses, deaths fall at relatively 
lower rates than a linear curve would predict.128 If a dose-response curve 
is supralinear, of course, the death rate will be higher than if it is linear. 
Agencies do not assume supralinearity, apparently because it is an 
unusual pattern. No one has urged supralinearity in the context of arsenic. 
 
b. Linearity. It has long been assumed that linear curves are appropriate for 
“genotoxic” carcinogens, that is, carcinogens that work directly on DNA 
to produce mutations that give rise to tumors.129 For a long time arsenic 
                                                 
126Ralph L. Kodell, U-Shaped Dose-Response Relationships for Mutation and Cancer, forth-
coming, Human and Ecological Risk Assessment (2001). 
127Casarett and Doull’s Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons 154 (Mary O. Amdur, John 
Doull, & Curtis D. Klaassen eds., 4th ed. 1991). See also D.G. Hoel et al., The Impact of Toxicity on 
Carcinogenicity Studies: Implications for Risk Assessment, 9 Carcinogenesis 2045 (1988); E.M. 
Laska & M.J. Meisner, Statistical Methods and the Application of Bioassay, 27 Annual Rev. 
Pharmacol. Toxicol. 385 (1988); D.B. Farrar & K.S. Crump, Exact Statistical Tests for any 
Carcinogenic Effect in Animal Bioassays, 15 Fundament. Appl. Toxicol. 710 (1990). 
128John W. Gofman, Radiation-Induced Cancer from Low-Dose Exposure: An Independent 
Analysis (1990) 
129See Kodel, supra note.  
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has been assumed not to be genotoxic, a point that draws the EPA’s 
assumption of linearity into some doubt; sublinearity is the ordinary 
assumption for nongenotoxic carcinogens. But a recent paper suggests 
that arsenic might be genotoxic after all.130 
 
c. Sublinearity. According to a standard text, the typical dose-response curve 
is “sigmoidal” in shape and thus sublinear at low doses.131 While there is 
some dispute about the issue, evidence suggests that this is the shape of 
the dose-response curve for benzene.132 As noted, scientists generally 
assume sublinearity for substances that are nongeotoxic, that is, that do 
not work directly on DNA.133 
 
d. Thresholds. Sometimes there is a threshold below which exposure 
produces no adverse effects, as is apparently the case for basal cell 
carcinoma and exposure to the sun.134 This is the extreme case of 
sublinearity. It is generally agreed that thresholds exist “for all toxicities 
other than cancer.  . . . Conceptually, a threshold makes sense for most 
toxic effects.”135 But government agencies tend to treat carcinogens as 
lacking safe thresholds. Taken purely as a scientific judgment, this is 
disputed: “It is a fact that most of the identified human carcinogens 
induce cancer only after exposure to high doses.”136 
 
e. U-shapes. Some dose-response curves (as for flouride) actually show 
desirable effects at low levels, so that what is harmful to health at high 
doses turns out to produce beneficial effects at low doses.137 There appears 
to be increasing reason to believe that u-shapes are common. “In recent 
years, the concept of hormesis, the phenomenon whereby a toxic 
substance elicits a beneficial effect at doses below its observed range of 
                                                 
130Trivalent Methylated  Arsenic Species are Genotoxic, Chemical Research in Toxicology (Apr. 
16, 2001). 
131Encyclopedia of Toxicology 509 (Philip Wexler ed., 1998). 
132See O. Wong and G.K. Raabe, Cell-Type-Specific Leukemia Analyses in a Combined Cohort 
of More than 208,000 Petroleum Workers, 21 Regul. Toxicol. Pharmacol. 380 (1995). 
133Purchase IFH and Auton TR. 1995. Thresholds in Chemical Carcinogenesis, Regul Toxicol 
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134See A Dose Response Curve for Sun Exposure and Basal Cell Carcinoma, 60 International 
Journal of Cancer 482 (1995). 
135Philip Williams et al., Principles of Toxicology 449 (2000). 
136Toxicology 176 (Hans Marquardt et. al eds., 1999). 
137Ralph Kodel and Qi Zheng, U-Shaped Dose-Response Curves for Carcinogenesis, abstract  
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toxicity, has been gaining popularity among scientists engaged in 
toxicology and risk assessment.”138 
 
The possibility of varying shapes suggests many possible projections of the 
health consequences of exposure to low doses of arsenic. Without having any 
direct evidence for arsenic in particular, the National Research Council 
suggested, “Of the several modes of action that are considered most plausible, a 
sub-linear dose response curve in the low-dose range is predicted, though 
linearity cannot be ruled out.”139 
 
This statement should be taken as exceptionally speculative. It ought not 
to be read to suggest a reliable scientific judgment about the true dose-response 
curve. In fact the NRC offered no evidence that would justify its “prediction” for 
arsenic.  It appears to have been generalizing from the more typical patterns. If a 
specific judgment is required, this approach is as sensible as any other; but it is 
not much more than a hunch. Nonetheless, we can reach some more definite 
conclusions. First: When agencies generally assume linearity, it is not because 
anything in the science solidly justifies this assumption, but because of a 
“conservative” approach to uncertain data.140 This is a policy choice, not a 
technical one – a point with implications for judicial review, as we shall see. 
Second: Rather than setting forth a specific number, it seems best to acknowledge 
the uncertainty about the dose-response curve, and hence to identify a range of 
benefits, capturing a low end and a high end.  
 
                                                 
138See id. The author’s conclusion is worth quoting: “For carcinogens that may exhibit U-
shaped dose-response curves, traditional linear, low-dose extrapolation truly is conservative in 
the sense of public-health protection.  However, this ‘default’ procedure cannot be justified 
simply on the basis of either presumed genotoxicity or additivity to background.  If definitive 
data on low-dose behavior of specific carcinogens should indicate U-shaped behavior, then 
relaxing the default procedure to accommodate substantially lower-than-linear estimates of risk 
seems justified, without fear of seriously underestimating risk (EPA 1996). However, it will 
require strong data, of a nature and quality not customarily available, to warrant a regulatory 
agency’s acceptance of a dose-response relationship that predicts less-than-background risk at 
low doses. The modeling exercise presented here provides additional support and 
encouragement for investigators to pursue the gathering of biologically definitive data other than 
typical tumor incidence data when hormesis is strongly suggested or conjectured.” 
139 See Arsenic in Drinking Water, supra. 
140 But see  Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis, 3 N.Y.U. 
Env. L.J. 295, 341–45 (1995), for some evidence that linearity is a scientifically plausible 
assumption.  
30   
The upshot? For arsenic in particular, the high end emerges from a linear 
curve and would therefore be 28. The low end is 6, which is what emerges from 
dividing that number by five. That division is essentially arbitrary, so we should 
not credit the Burnett/Hahn suggestion that it is likely to be accurate.  
 
2. Nonquantified benefits. What about the nonquantified benefits? Here it 
is certainly responsible to say, with the EPA, that the data do not allow 
numerical judgments of any kind. But it would also be responsible to attempt to 
specify an upper and lower bound. Burnett and Hahn estimate the 
“nonquantified” benefits by multiplying EPA’s expected lives saved by two. But 
this seems arbitrary. As they note, the National Research Council estimated the 
risk of all types of cancer as eight times greater than the risk from bladder cancer 
alone. Because EPA’s figure of 28 came from both bladder and lung cancer, it 
would have been sensible to posit a range, with an upper bound of 112 
(multiplying 28 times four). If the lower bound (from the analysis of possible 
sublinearity) is 6, the upper bound, from that assumption, would be 24.  
 
3. Problems in Taiwan. I have suggested that there are many reasons to 
question the Taiwan data, which involved a poorer population, with a worse 
diet, at risk of arsenic exposure from multiple sources other than drinking water. 
Another criticism of the Taiwan data is that it measures arsenic exposure by 
overall exposure to village wells and not individual exposure.141 There is an 
additional problem. Wells within each village had varying arsenic  levels (so that 
people using certain wells had much higher exposures than others in the same 
village), but not all village wells were measured, and  
villagers were assigned a single median concentration (the data also did not  
account for villagers who moved, since it assumed a lifetime exposure to the  
levels of a subject's present village).  Thus the principal data on which the EPA 
relied was “noisy,” and unavoidably so. The NRC explicitly acknowledged this 
point: “Some factors, such as poor nutrition and arsenic intake from food, might 
affect assessment of risk in Taiwan or extrapolation of results in the United 
States.”142 
 
The best conclusion is that with reasonable assumptions, the number of 
lives saved from the regulation would range between 6 and 112. To say the least, 
that is an exceedingly wide range. If the regulation were expected to cost $6 
million, it would seem reasonable to proceed; almost no one denies that a cost 
                                                 
141See 66 Fed. Reg. at. 7003. 
142Arsenic in Drinking Water, supra note, p. 301.  
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per life saved of $1 million is worthwhile. If the regulation were expected to cost 
$10 billion, it would seem reasonable not to proceed. But what if the cost fell 
between $6 million and $10 billion? What if the cost were $200 million (as the 
EPA estimated?) To make progress on that question, it is necessary to discuss the 
question of monetization. 
 
B. Monetizing 
 
With respect to money, the principal disagreement between EPA and 
Burnett-Hahn involves the appropriate discount rate. I will return to that issue 
shortly; for the moment let us put it to one side. As the EPA acknowledges in its 
“sensitivity analysis,” there are good reasons, in fact, to adjust EPA’s monetized 
estimate upwards rather than downwards.  
 
1. Arsenic vs. the workplace. As I have noted, the EPA’s $6.1 million 
comes from workplace risks, not involving cancer, and generally involving 
dangers to which workers expose themselves voluntarily, in the sense that they 
receive compensation in return. In fact many questions might be raised about the 
workplace risk studies.143 One problem is the sheer variety of the number in 
those studies, ranging from $0.7 million, in 1997 dollars, to $16.3 million. 
Consider the following table:144  
 
Table 5 
Value of Life Studies 
Study  Method  Value of Statistical Life 
Kneisner and Leith (1991)  Labor market  $0.7 million 
Smith and Gilbert (1984)  Labor market  $0.8 million 
Dillingham (1985)  Labor market  1.1 million 
Marin and Psacharopoulos 
(1982) 
Labor market  3.4 million 
V.K. Smith (1976)  Labor market  5.7 million 
Viscusi (1981)  Laboir market  7.9 million 
Leigh and Folsom (1984)  Labor market  11.7 million 
Leigh (1987)  Labor market  12.6 million 
Garen (1988)  Labor market  16.3 million 
 
                                                 
143See Robert Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 323 (2001), for several such questions. For a reply, see Gregory Besharov, Three Questions 
About the Economic of Relative Position: A Reply to Frank and Sunstein, available at 
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144See EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses 89 (2000).  
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The sheer variety of the outcomes raises questions about the reliability of 
the $6.1 million figures. EPA updated the relevant numbers for inflation, but it 
did not otherwise make adjustments. On reasonable assumptions, the EPA 
appears to have produced a significant undervaluation of the monetary value of 
the lives at stake. Consider the following points. 
 
a. Income growth. The EPA acknowledged that the $6.1 million figure 
reflects no adjustment to account for changes in national real income growth. In 
principle, the failure to undertake an adjustment seems to be a serious mistake. 
Of course people with more money would be willing to pay more, other things 
being equal, to reduce statistical risks. As the EPA also noted in its sensitivity 
analysis, the appropriate adjustment would increase the VSL from $6.1 million to 
$6.7 million.145 
 
b. Distinctive risks. The risk of cancer from drinking water is qualitatively 
different from the workplace risks that EPA used to generate its VSL. The risks 
from drinking water seem peculiarly involuntary and uncontrollable, and a great 
deal of literature suggests that involuntary and uncontrollable risks produce an 
unusually high willingness to pay.146 Now it is important not to think that there 
is a rigid dichotomy between the involuntary/uncontrollable and the 
voluntary/controllable.147 This is a continuum, without sharp divisions among 
various points. The underlying issues seem to be whether those exposed to the 
risk are exposed knowingly and whether it is costly or otherwise difficult for 
people to avoid the risk. But as compared to workplace risks, there can be little 
doubt that the risk of arsenic from drinking water is worse along the relevant 
dimensions. For this reason, it makes sense to think that people would be willing 
to pay a premium to avoid the risks associated with arsenic. 
 
There are some related points. People seem to have a special fear of 
cancer, and they seem to be willing to pay more to prevent a cancer death than a 
sudden unanticipated death, or a death from heart disease.148 The “cancer 
premium” might be produced by the “dread” nature of cancer; it seems well-
established that some risks are particularly dreaded, and that dreaded risks 
produce special social concern, holding the statistical risk constant. Some studies 
                                                 
14566 Fed. Reg. at 7012. 
146See Slovic, supra note 82. 
147See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 259, 260 (1997).  
148See George Tolley et al., State of the Art Health Values 339–40 (1993).  
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suggest that people are willing to pay twice as much to prevent a cancer death as 
an instantaneous death.149 
 
  The EPA was alert to these points. Hence its own sensitivity analysis 
suggests that  need for an upwards revision of 7%,  because of the 
involuntariness and uncontrollability of the risk.150 With this revision, along with 
the revision for income growth, the value of a statistical life would rise to about 
$7.2 million.151 In fact there are reasons to suggest that this might be far too low. 
A careful study suggests that “the value of avoiding a death from an involuntary, 
carcinogenic risk should be estimated as four times as large as the value of 
avoiding an instantaneous workplace fatality.”152 If we take this approach, the 
value jumps from $6.7 million to $26.8 million.  
 
c. One more wealth effect. There is a final point. The studies that produced 
the $6.1 million figure involved the workplace, and the people involved were 
poorer than most workers. Because the  median salary of all wage earners is 23% 
higher than the median salary of most workers involved in the willingness-to-
pay studies, a further adjustment seems appropriate, producing a VSL of $33 
million.  
 
Now it would be foolish to claim that this figure has a unique claim to 
accuracy. But with different assumptions, none of them entirely implausible, the 
value of a statistical life can range from $1.1 million to $33 million – and the 
number of lives saved from 6 to 112. That produces a lower bound, in terms of 
dollars, of $6.6 million – and an upper bound, in terms of dollars, of $3.15 billion!  
 
  d. Life-years as opposed to lives. Would the arsenic rule protect young 
people or old people? The question seems to matter, for in principle, it is better 
for the government to devote resources toward saving many years rather than 
simply a few.153 If the government can prevent a death at 75 that would 
otherwise occur at 80, surely it should attempt to do so; but if resources are 
limited, it would do better to prevent a death at 20 that would otherwise occur at 
80. In part because of the long latency period involved, the average age of the 
victims of arsenic-induced cancer would be relatively high, probably above 
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15066 Fed. Reg. at 7014. 
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retirement age.154  Nonetheless, the EPA treated each life involved as worth $6.1 
million.  This number might well be inflated. 
 
2. Discounting. It does seem sensible to say that a discount rate should be 
applied to latent harms. A cancer thirty years from now is not as bad as a cancer 
tomorrow. Note that this point does not take a stand on the controversial 
question whether harms to future generations should be discounted.155 The only 
suggestion is that people today would be willing to pay less to prevent a cancer 
in decades than a cancer in weeks. Now it would be possible to suggest that 
arsenic regulation is designed to prevent risks, not actual harms, and that the 
risks, unlike the harms, will occur immediately. The suggestion is correct, but it 
is not responsive. People would pay more to prevent a risk-of-a-harm in a month 
than a risk-of-a-harm in two decades; and that claim is sufficient to justify 
discounting here. 
 
But to make an assessment, it is not enough to decide to discount. We also 
have to decide (a) the appropriate discount rate and (b) the latency period. Hahn 
and Burnett choose a 7% figure, which comes from the discount rate for money. 
But there is no reason to think that the same discount rate is sensible for latent 
harms as for money, and some reason to think the opposite. If the 7% figure is 
correct for money, there are two reasons. First, money can be invested and will 
grow, and because of that simple fact a dollar today is worth more than a dollar 
in a year. Second, people have a “pure” time preference for current income. Even 
apart from investment value, it would be better to have money soon. If 
willingness to pay is to govern the discount rate, then the calculation of that rate, 
for money, should be a function of these two points. To be sure, government 
selection of the discount rate is usually a simplified version of this analysis, and 
depends on the investment value of money. 
 
But note that the analysis is not the same for risks of harm. It is not 
possible to “invest” good health, at least not in the same way as dollars. If one is 
going to get cancer in any event, a cancer-free year cannot be used to produce 
more of the same.  To be sure, most people would rather get cancer thirty years 
hence than ten years hence – perhaps in order to ensure more life-years, perhaps 
because of a pure time preference. And indeed, it would be desirable to shift the 
analysis from lives to life-years. But there is no reason to think that the time 
                                                 
154See American Society of Civil Engineers, Arsenic in Drinking Water  12 (available on the 
Internet). 
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preference for health is identical to the time preference for money. There are 
many uncertainties here. But some evidence supports a discount rate of 2%-3%, 
which would result, not in a figure of $1.1 million per life saved, but a figure 
closer to $4.5 million.156 My principal point is that it has not been shown that 
future health benefits should be discounted at the same rate as future monetary 
costs – and, more speculatively, that there is good reason to think that the 
discount rate for health benefits should be lower than the discount rate for 
monetary costs. 
 
What of the latency period? Hahn and Burnett chose thirty years, but this 
number seems both long and somewhat arbitrary. If the latency period is chosen 
to be twenty years rather than thirty, the number increases still further, 
approaching $5 million.  
 
Here is my own summary of possible cost-benefit assessments: 
 
Table 6 
Cost-Benefit Ranges 
 Lives  Benefits  Costs  Net  Benefits 
or Costs 
EPA 28  (plus 
unquantified) 
$170 million (plus unquantified)  $210 million  ??? 
AEI/Brookings 
“best estimate” 
11  $23 million  $210 million  –$190 million 
(Very) High 
estimate 
112  $3.3 billion  $210 million  $3.15 billion 
High estimate  112  $560 million  $210 million  $350 million 
My best “point 
estimate” 
None; too 
speculative 
Multiply lives saved by about 
$4.5 million (to accommodate 
both cancer premium and latency 
period); multiply nonfatal cancers 
prevented by about $400,000 
$210 million  No estimate 
Low estimate 
(based on 
fundamental 
acceptance of EPA 
conclusions) 
6  $13 million  $210 million  –$197 million 
(Very) Low 
estimate (based on 
external criticisms 
of EPA 
conclusions) 
0  0 million  $210 million  –$210 million 
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One final point on this table. It might be suggested that some effort should 
be made to identify a “best estimate,” and that analysis would be greatly 
improved by trying to assign probabilities to the various outcomes, with the 
“best estimate” consisting of the most probable one. The goal of this suggestion is 
correct. When the underlying science and economics allow analysts to come up 
with a “best estimate” and to assign probabilities to the alternative outcomes, 
this indeed should be done. In terms of monetizing the relevant values, it seems 
correct to say that the cancer risk deserves a premium, as compared to workplace 
risks, but also to insist on discounting the monetary value of the risk to take 
account of the latency period and the fewer life-years saved. Hence rough 
estimates of $4.5 million per life saved, and $400,000 per nonfatal cancer 
prevented, seem as reasonable as anything else, even if somewhat arbitrary.  At 
the very least, the EPA’s $6.1 million figure appears too high in light of the long 
latency period, and the AEI-Brookings $1.1 million figure appears too low in 
light of the high discount rate that it reflects and the various factors suggesting 
that the workplace studies understate the monetary value of the risk involved 
here. 
 
But with respect to health benefits, science does not allow best estimates to 
be provided here. It would be reasonable to suggest that the high estimate of 112 
is unrealistically high, a bit of a scare tactic, in light of the problems in the 
Taiwan data and the probability that the dose-response curve is sublinear. The 
estimate of 0 lives saved is highly improbable. But it does seem to me sensible to 
move to concern with life-years saved, rather than lives saved, and because of the 
long latency period, the quantified benefits are most unlikely to be much higher 
than the $210 million price tag. On the other hand, they might well be higher 
whether or not they are much higher, and for reasons to be elaborated shortly, 
the “bottom line” numbers need not be dispositive. 
 
      C. Lessons 
 
Does all this suggest that CBA is, in cases of this sort, unhelpful? It would 
not be hard to imagine an affirmative answer to that question. A skeptic might 
conclude that because the range of uncertainty is so large, any number at all 
could be justified, and the ultimate decision is essentially “political” or based on 
“values.” This view is not exactly wrong; but it should not be taken as a 
convincing challenge  to CBA.  
 
An analysis of benefits and costs cannot resolve the ultimate judgment, 
but it can certainly inform it. Once we understand the potential effects of  
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different arsenic regulations, and see where the uncertainties come from, we are 
in a much better position to know what to do. Of course a decision on that count 
will be a product of “values”; how could it be otherwise? The point is that the 
values should be identified as such, so that when government acts, its reasons 
are transparent and explicable. If what I have said thus far is correct, the choice 
of a new arsenic rule is a genuinely hard question. Under the best case scenario, 
the benefits will exceed the costs, though not by a great deal; under the worst 
case scenario, the costs will dwarf the benefits. It is a tribute to CBA that we 
know exactly why the ultimate judgment is hard. 
 
V. CBA in Court 
 
We are now in a position to see the multiple possible challenges to any 
agency decision that involves cost-benefit balancing. Because such balancing has 
become a staple of regulatory practice, it is important for lawyers to have some 
understanding of the underlying ideas, and of how agencies might be said to 
have gone wrong. There are lessons for courts as well, mostly involving the need 
for deference to agencies.  
 
A. Lawyers: How To Make Benefits Go Way Up or Way Down 
 
With respect to the regulation of social risks, the legal culture is 
increasingly required to pay close attention to both science and economics,157 and 
here legal understanding remains in a primitive state. If we keep in mind the 
arithmetic of arsenic, we can see how creative lawyers, representing water 
systems or environmentalists, might be able to mount reasonable challenges to 
EPA’s decisions, regardless (almost) of the content of those decisions. There are 
several points to keep in mind. 
 
1.  A great deal depends on the dose-response curve, and at low levels, 
the scientific evidence will often be inconclusive. With the assumption 
of a linear curve, the benefits of regulation will seem far higher than 
they might otherwise be. But from the scientific point of view, that 
assumption might well be vulnerable. In the case of arsenic, the most 
striking point is that the independent entities on which EPA relies 
actually split on the issue, with the Scientific Advisory Board 
supporting linearity, and the National Research Council tentatively 
favoring sublinearity. There is mixed evidence on the crucial question 
                                                 
157See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201; ATA, (DC Cir 1999), reversed, US  
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whether metabolized arsenic is dangerous. In addition, linearity makes 
more sense for genotoxic carcinogens, and there is a dispute as well 
about whether arsenic is genotoxic. A decision to assume linearity, in 
the face of scientific uncertainty, is best seen as a policy judgment. 
Under a statute that calls for a “margin of safety,” such a judgment is 
plainly supportable. It is not clear that an agency can indulge such a 
judgment under a statute that calls for cost-benefit balancing. For a 
lawyer objecting to regulation that seems too stringent, the best claim 
is that sublinearity is more likely, given the body’s ability to 
metabolize at low levels.  For a lawyer objecting to regulation that 
seems inadequate, the best claim is that in the absence of specific data, 
linearity is the standard default assumption on policy grounds. 
2.  When regulating a pollutant, EPA will often have to rely on evidence 
from other times and areas, and it will not be difficult to suggest that 
there are relevant differences between the population at issue and the 
population involved on that evidence. In the case of arsenic, the 
Taiwan data could certainly be challenged as inadequate, in light of 
the absence of data from the United States that confirms the basic 
results. 
3.  If cancer risks are involved, the agency’s decision to use its ordinary 
VSL  can be criticized on the ground that solid evidence shows a 
higher VSL for risks that are dreaded and uncontrollable (as cancer 
risks are likely to be). Lawyers objecting to insufficiently aggressive 
regulation should use this evidence to suggest that the numbers that 
come from workplace studies are simply too little. Lawyers objecting 
to overaggressive regulation should insist that the only reliable data 
come from the workplace studies, and that any effort to produce 
higher numbers are too speculative.  
4.  Agencies frequently lack good data on morbidity risks, and use crude 
substitutes. These are easily subject to challenge. An environmental 
lawyer could easily urge, in the arsenic case, that the chronic bronchitis 
numbers are too low, because a cause of cancer is highly likely to 
produce higher WTP than a case of chronic bronchitis. For their part, 
industry lawyers could easily urge that chronic bronchitis is 
comparable or perhaps worse, simply because it is chronic. A case of 
cured cancer, even if it is entirely cured, is not much more serious than 
a case of any other curable disease. In either case, it would be easy to 
challenge the actual numbers used for chronic bronchitis as unreliable, 
because they were generated through responses by shoppers, in North  
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Carolina, to hypothetical questions. Even if well-designed, that study 
is not likely to produce reliable numbers.  
5.  If an agency uses lives rather than life-years, there may be a serious 
problem, at least if the regulation would protect a large number of 
children or elderly people. For protection of children, the $6.1 million 
figure is arguably far too low. For protection of elderly people, that 
same figure is arguably far too high.158  
6.  For a lawyer on either side, it is not hard to argue that nonquantified 
benefits should be quantified, if this is at all possible. Without 
quantification, how can agency decisions be evaluated? Once a 
decision is made to quantify benefits that had formerly been 
unquantified, agency judgments are subject to challenge, because the 
judgment about how to quantify will be so speculative. If the agency 
has not specified a range, but has relied on a fairly specific projection, 
it will be extremely vulnerable. 
7.  The level of monetized benefits will differ dramatically in accordance 
with the chosen discount rate. It would be easy to challenge any 
agency’s decision not to discount a risk that will come to fruition in the 
future. A monetary loss, or a loss to health, is worse today than years 
hence. And once the agency has chosen to discount, any particular 
discount rate might well be challenged. Economists disagree about the 
proper approach. If the agency chooses a discount rate for health in the 
vicinity of the discount rate for money (7% to 10%), its choice might 
well be challenged, on the ground that no good evidence supports the 
view that health problems averted should be discounted at the same 
rate as financial losses averted. But if the agency chooses a discount 
rate below 7%, it would not be hard to challenge that choice as 
essentially arbitrary and unsupported by evidence. 
 
B.  Against Science Courts 
 
Notwithstanding the availability of countless legal challenges, the basic 
lesson for courts is simple: Hands off. This means that when courts are reviewing 
an agency’s judgments about health benefits, and about how to monetize them, 
they should give agencies the benefit of every reasonable doubt. 
 
                                                 
158It is not clear, however, how to think about willingness to pay in this context. Older people 
tend to be wealthier, and they might well be willing to be large amounts to protect relatively few 
life years.  
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The reasons are threefold. First, the issues are exceedingly complex, and 
judges are not specialists in the area at hand. Like everyone else, they are prone 
to error. There is no systematic reason to think that a firm judicial hand will 
make things better rather than worse. Second, any judicial judgment will 
perpetuate the status quo and make rulemaking more difficult.159 Because it is 
extremely time-consuming to make rules, and because a clever advocate, on one 
or another side, is highly likely to be able to produce a plausible challenge to 
whatever an agency does, an aggressive judicial posture will essentially freeze 
whatever rule is currently in place. In many domains, people have expressed 
concern with the “ossification” of rulemaking. When a statute calls for cost-
benefit balancing, any nondeferential posture, from courts, will magnify the risk 
of ossification. Third, many of the underlying decisions involve values, not facts. 
We have seen that the choice between a linear and sublinear dose-response curve 
cannot be based on direct evidence. Any choice has a large policymaking 
dimension. “There is wide recognition among experts—but not necessarily in the 
public opinion—that current approaches to the regulation of most agents remain 
judgmental.”160 In this light, courts should be reluctant to displace the judgments 
of administrators, who have advantages both as technocrats and as public 
representatives. 
 
This does not mean that agencies should be permitted to do whatever they 
want. We can easily imagine genuinely arbitrary decisions.161 But so long as the 
agency has not done something truly unreasonable, its efforts to quantify health 
benefits, and to monetize them, should be held acceptable. 
 
VI. Policy Analysts: What Should Be Done? 
 
A. No Obviously Best Choice 
 
1. Puzzles. On the analysis thus far, it should be clear that there is no 
obviously best choice for EPA.  Of the options considered, the most dramatic 
would be the two poles: to retain the existing 50 ppb standard or to select the 3 
ppb standard, which the EPA deemed feasible. Neither of these choices would be 
ludicrous, and neither should be seen as violative of the SWDA. 
Notwithstanding the NRC report, it would be possible to conclude that the 
existing data, most of it from Taiwan, simply does not justify further restrictions, 
                                                 
159See Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, The Challenge of Auto Safety (1993). 
160Toxicology 1145 (Hans Marquardt et al. eds., 1999). 
161 See id.  
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especially in light of studies suggesting no adverse effects from low levels of 
arsenic in drinking water. And notwithstanding the AEI-Brookings study, it 
would not be impossible to produce numbers suggesting that the 3 ppb standard 
might well be justified, at least if the nonquantified benefits are taken into 
account, and pegged at the higher points in the range.  
 
2. Tiebreakers. Might it be possible to resolve the controversy through 
some general, background  considerations? Where individuals and governments 
are not sure what to do, they often invoke “second-order” principles, designed to 
simplify inquire in the event of difficulty.162 There are several possibilities here. 
 
One solution would be to invoke the “precautionary principle,” which 
says that reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of protecting safety, 
health, and the environment.163  The precautionary principle has had a significant 
influence on both national and international environmental policy.164 It also 
seems to track private behavior. People purchase smoke alarms and insurance; 
perhaps regulation of arsenic can be seen as analogous.  In the face of scientific 
uncertainty, why not make an expenditure that might well turn out to avert 
serious harm?165 In a catchphrase: Better safe than sorry.166 
 
If this point is meant to suggest that significant investments are 
worthwhile to prevent speculative harms, it is certainly correct. But everything 
depends on the size of the investment and the speculativeness of the harm. 
Taken seriously, one problem with the precautionary principle is that it would 
lead to huge expenditures, exhausting the relevant budget before the menu of 
options could be thoroughly consulted. Indeed, the precautionary principle 
would lead to paralysis, because there are risks on all sides of the equation.167 
Recall that many households would be required to spend more than $300 per 
year for water; EPA Administrator Whitman has expressed a concern that the 
increased expenditure will lead many people to use small, local wells, which 
                                                 
162See Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, in Behavioral 
Law and Economics 187 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000). 
163Protecting Public Health & the Environment : Implementing the Precautionary Principle 
(Carolyn Raffensberger 2001). 
164See id. 
165The point might be supported by the fact that people are generally averse to low-
probability, high-risk accounts, and would be willing to pay relatively high amounts so as not to 
run the relevant risks. See Choices, Values, and Frames (Daniel Kahneman ed. 2001). 
166See Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1996), for a critical discussion. 
167See Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle (2000).  
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have heavily polluted water.168 In these circumstances, the precautionary 
principle suggests that new arsenic regulation is undesirable, because it might 
sacrifice lives. Recall too that expensive regulations can have adverse effects on 
life and health, and hence that the $210 million expenditure for arsenic regulation 
has, as a worst case scenario, significant adverse health effects, with perhaps as 
many as thirty to forty lives lost.169 If this is so, the precautionary principle seems 
to argue against new regulation. It seems clear that precaution, by itself, can be 
taken argue for no regulation, much regulation, and every point in between. On 
reflection the idea is entirely unhelpful. 
 
Perhaps a more refined argument is better. For most of the country, the 
incremental cost of the arsenic regulation is low – less than $30 per year. If the 
vast majority of people would receive additional protection at a cost that is high 
in the aggregate ($210 million) but low for each affected family, shouldn’t 
government proceed, perhaps with exemptions or subsidies for those who would 
have to pay more? The argument is not implausible, but it proves too much. In 
many cases, it would be possible to do some good by asking everyone to pay, 
say, $2 per year. Should the EPA ask every family to pay $2 year, so as to create a 
$500 million fund to be used to pay for additional reductions in sulfur dioxide 
emissions? Carbon monoxide emissions? Benzene emissions? Clean-up of lead 
paint? Anti-tobacco advertising? Childhood immunizations? Relief of poverty? 
Because the list of possibilities is endless, it is unhelpful to treat small per-family 
costs as if they were zero; we do better to ensure that those funds are used for 
purposes that would do more good than harm. This does not mean that a 
regulation imposing small per-family costs (say, $30 per family, for 200 million  
people) should be treated as identical to a regulation imposing the same 
aggregate but higher per-family costs (say, $300 per family, for 20 million 
people). High per-family costs do raise particular concerns. But a regulation that 
fails cost-benefit balancing should not be accepted on the ground that each 
family or person will pay little.  
 
                                                 
168 “But we have seen instances, particularly in the West and Midwest, where arsenic is 
naturally occurring at up to 700 and more parts per billion, where the cost of remediation has 
forced water companies to close, leaving people with no way to get their water, save dig wells. 
And then they are getting water that’s even worse than what they were getting through the water 
company.” Interview by  Robert Novak & Al Hunt, CNN Evans, Novak, Hunt & Shields, Cable 
News Network, with Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (Apr. 21, 2001). 
169 See Burnett and Hahn, supra note; on the general phenomenon, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Health-Health Tradeoffs, in Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (199).  
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But another tiebreaker is possible. Perhaps the EPA should refrain from 
further regulation on the theory that government should not act unless there is a 
clear demonstration that it is desirable, all things considered. Perhaps we should 
adopt a presumption against regulatory controls unless the CBA shows that they 
are justified, or unless there are special reasons – perhaps distributional in 
character – that support them. Perhaps the government should not require costly 
expenditures here, in view of the fact that the same expenditures might be used 
for other goals, such as crime reduction and automobile safety, where they could 
do more good.170 
 
The problem is that the same kind of argument could have been used 
against a wide range of environmental regulations, even though those 
regulations have, on balance, been vindicated by history.171 In the context of air 
quality regulation, a contemporaneous assessment of costs and benefits would, 
in many cases, have given rise to the same kind of uncertainty found here. Note 
that this is not to suggest that in such cases, the costs would have been found to 
outweigh the benefits. The problem is instead that the most that could have been 
done was to identify a “benefits range” leaving a great deal of uncertainty about 
what to do. If the past is any guide, it suggests that inaction, in such 
circumstances, would be a foolish course. 
 
3. Between the poles? While no particular approach would be obviously 
best, or obviously unreasonable, the more reasonable approaches would appear 
to be between the poles. On the existing numbers, the 3 ppb standard seems hard 
to justify. No data supports the view that there would be significant health gains 
from moving from a 10 ppb ceiling to one of 3 ppb. In view of the significant 
expense of the restriction, 10 ppb seems better. At the same time, the data do 
raise questions about the existence of significant risks at the 50 ppb level. A new 
regulation might be seen as a kind of insurance policy, one without an enormous 
price tag. A choice between the 50 and 3 ppb  ceiling would seem to be best – 
especially if it would be possible to relieve the high burdens imposed on some 
households. 
 
This last point raises a more general one, overlooked thus far: The EPA’s 
menu of alternatives has been relatively narrow, and has lacked much creativity. 
                                                 
170 Cf. Stephen Breyer, Breaking  the Vicious Circle (1993) (arguing for better priority-setting). 
171 Paul Portnoy, Air Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 77, 101–5 
(Paul Portnoy and Robert Stavins eds 2000). 
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The EPA discussed four different permissible exposure levels, without thinking 
more imaginatively about how to minimize the costs of arsenic regulation. The 
blame for the narrow focus lies not with EPA, but with Congress. I now discuss 
several other approaches, designed to show more flexibility toward those 
burdened by drinking water regulation. 
 
B. Arsenic Targeting and Arsenic Waiving 
 
A possible approach would involve “targeting,” that is, imposing 
regulation on water systems when the cost-benefit ratio is especially good. Recall 
that for much of the country, the cost of compliance with the 10 ppb standard is 
quite low. On plausible (which is not to say certainly correct) assumptions, the 
cost-benefit ratio, for those systems, is adequate to justify the regulation. These 
points suggest a simple alternative: Impose a targeted rule, with a sliding scale of 
regulations, ensuring that the cost-benefit ratio supports the outcome in each 
area. Where, for example, the annual cost of regulation is less than $50 per 
household, government might impose a 5 ppb standard; where the annual cost is 
less than $150, it might impose a 10 ppb standard; where it is less than $350, it 
might impose a 20 ppb standard. 
 
An approach of this kind would undoubtedly be controversial. Critics 
would ask: Why should people in some parts of the country be subject to more 
arsenic in their drinking water than others? The question might seem especially 
difficult to answer if, as seems likely, many of those subject to the more lenient 
standard would be relatively poor. Why should poor people, and especially poor 
children, face levels of arsenic found unacceptably dangerous in other parts of 
the country? But these questions have more rhetorical force than they deserve. If 
acceptable levels of risk are a function of both cost and benefit, it makes perfect 
sense to say that such levels will vary depending on the costs and benefits of 
controls in different localities.  In some areas of the country, it will be worthwhile 
to “purchase” an additional increment of safety; in other areas, it will not be. 
 
This point seems sufficient to suggest that EPA should have the authority 
to impose national standards that are not uniform. But the SWDA forbids any 
such nonuniform standards. In keeping with its cost-benefit focus, the statute 
should be amended so as to allow EPA greater flexibility. 
 
If EPA cannot adopt a targeted regulation, might it allow waivers for areas 
in which the benefits do not justify the costs? Once the data are disaggregated, it 
seems reasonable to consider the following option: Adopt the 10 ppb regulation  
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for most water systems, where the per-family cost of compliance is low; but offer 
a variance for water systems where the per-family cost is high. In fact this 
approach would be quite close to one involving targeted regulation. The SDWA 
does allow waivers, but only for short periods of time, and hence waivers are a 
less satisfactory outcome than targeting. 
 
C. Arsenic Markets 
 
In all of contemporary environmental law, some of most dramatic 
developments have involved the rise of market instruments for pollution control. 
These instruments take many forms, but among the most popular are “cap and 
trade” systems, in which the total level of emissions is capped at a certain level, 
and polluters are allowed to trade licenses, so long as the cap is respected.172 A 
chief advantage of cap and trade systems is that they ensure the lowest-cost 
means of achieving regulatory goals. Those who can eliminate pollution cheaply 
will do exactly that. Those for whom reductions are expensive will purchase 
additional permits. 
 
Why not create a system of tradable emissions rights, involving the right 
to subject people to arsenic? The idea might well seem macabre. But if so, the 
reason is likely to be a belief that arsenic is a poison, seriously dangerous at any 
level. This is a form of intuitive toxicology. If we suppose that within the range 
under discussion (say, 3 ppb to 20 ppb),  dangerously high exposure levels will 
not occur, and the issue is one of appropriate degrees of safety, we could easily 
imagine a cap and trade system. Government could create an overall cap on 
arsenic, and give licenses to subject people to (say) 15 ppb, but also allow 
trading, so that companies that can reduce at low cost will do so, whereas those 
that can do so at only high cost will stay at 15 ppb or perhaps buy licenses to 
subject people to higher levels. Because of the familiar “hot spots” problem, 
government would, under this regime, take steps to ensure that no one is 
subjected to unacceptably high levels – say, 25 ppm or higher.  
 
As compared with a system of national command-and-control, it is likely 
that a system of this kind would produce much lower costs. Indeed, a system of 
tradable rights would likely spur considerable innovation in arsenic control 
technology. To evaluate it, we would want to know the aggregate cost of the 
system, and also compare the likely benefits to those that would be enjoyed 
under the alternatives. It is not unimaginable that properly designed, a cap-and-
                                                 
172For an excellent discussion, see A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air (2000).  
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trade system would produce both lower costs and higher benefits than the 
command-and-control alternative. Note in this regard that the Clinton 
Administration proposed a 10 ppb ceiling, to be applied nationally, but that a 
cap-and-trade system might ensure that in much of the country, people would 
have levels well below 10 ppb.  
 
As compared with a system of arsenic targeting, the chief advantage of a 
cap-and-trade system is that it imposes less of an informational demand on the 
government, allowing the market, rather than EPA, to ascertain the costs of 
arsenic reduction.  Under arsenic targeting, the EPA would have to decide, in 
every area of the country, the real costs of reduction to various points – a difficult 
determination for which error is inevitable. Under cap-and-trade, those with low 
costs will trade their licenses, whereas those with high costs will attempt to 
acquire more in the way of arsenic rights. Of course the same objections that 
might be made to arsenic targeting might be made to a system of cap-and-trade. 
Perhaps poor people will be subject to unusually high arsenic levels. But if these 
objections are not convincing there, they are also unconvincing in this context. 
 
Under SDWA, however, the EPA lacks the authority to implement a 
trading system for arsenic. This is a serious gap. The statute should be amended 
to allow the EPA to permit trading if the evidence justifies that step. Of course 
trading should not be allowed to create what are, under existing science, 
unacceptable “hot spots.” 
 
D. Arsenic Reduction Subsidies 
 
It has been suggested that the EPA should impose a stringent regulation 
of arsenic, but that the federal government should subsidize communities for 
which the annual cost is high. Of course the EPA cannot offer subsidies on its 
own. But perhaps Congress should do so. In  fact Congress has made federal 
financial assistance available for water systems, and while the relevant programs 
contain a degree of discretion, it is certainly possible for financially strapped 
water systems to receive federal help.173 
 
Recall that the total cost of the 10 ppb regulation would be about $210 
million each year. To say the least, this would not be a large sum in the federal 
budget. If the federal government restricted itself to paying the cost of 
                                                 
17366 Fed. Reg. at 6992.  
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compliance in areas in which the annual per-household cost exceeds $100, its 
total taxpayer bill would be about $10 million – hardly a large sum to pay. 
 
Clearly this would not be a foolish approach to the arsenic problem. The 
difficulty is that we do not know, from the numbers, whether this is the best way 
to spend limited taxpayer dollars. Suppose that the risks that the regulation is 
reducing are quite small, so that the regulation will save somewhere between 0 
and 0.5 lives.  Is it really worthwhile to spend $10 million to save between 0 and 
0.5 lives? Many government programs are designed to decrease risks to life and 
health; some of those programs attempt to reduce violent crime. Perhaps the $10 
million would be better spent on those programs. Now it would be possible to 
say that as a practical matter, any $10 million subsidy is more likely to come from 
some other, less valuable use, and that by using it to protect people against the 
health hazards of arsenic, we would not really be diverting resources from a 
more valuable use.  Among the universe of imaginable government 
expenditures, a $10 million subsidy is hardly the worst. But in light of existing 
data, we cannot be sure that it is the best. The same considerations that justify 
cost-benefit balancing in the first place suggest that the hard issues cannot be 
avoided by arguing for an across-the-board 10 ppb standard, accompanied by a 
federal subsidy for those who face a difficult financial burden.  
 
E. Arsenic Disclosure 
 
An alternative possibility would be to rely less on regulation and more on 
information. In many domains of regulatory policy, government has moved to 
replace command-and-control with efforts to require companies to disclose their 
activities, and relevant risks, to the public.174  In the context at hand, the 
suggestion would be simple: Require companies to meet some statutory 
requirement, so that people are not exposed to clear harm (30 ppb?), but beyond 
that point, require companies to disclose the level of arsenic in their drinking 
water, perhaps with information that would put the numbers into some context. 
Perhaps the disclosure requirement would not apply if companies reached some 
low level (10 ppb?). We could thus imagine a kind of three-tiered rule, with a flat 
mandates, a disclosure requirement for a certain range, and a “floor” below 
which companies would have no disclosure duties. 
 
                                                 
174For overviews, see Bradley Karkkainen, Information As Environmental Regulation, 89 
Georgetown L. J. 257 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational 
Standing, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613 (1999).  
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For arsenic, this strategy would have both advantages and disadvantages. 
One advantage is that it could spur companies to reduce arsenic levels on their 
own, without governmental requirements.175 For companies who chose that 
route, it is likely that the reductions would not be terribly expensive. Public 
pressure might produce low-cost reductions in some areas, while also allowing 
companies to maintain certain levels of arsenic if the public, in those areas, was 
not so concerned in light of the mix of health benefits and water costs. In this 
way, disclosure might even produce a kind of “drinking water federalism.” 
Another advantage of disclosure is that it might perform an important educative 
role, ensuring that people will learn that some carcinogenic substances are not 
especially dangerous and also alerting people to the need for tradeoffs (in the 
form of a higher water bill).  
 
But there are pitfalls as well. We have seen that the very idea of arsenic in 
drinking water seems to cause serious public alarm, in part because of the 
operation of intuitive toxicology. For a certain percentage of the population, 
disclosure of arsenic would itself signal reason for concern, and perhaps produce 
excessive fear, even panic. Many people might ask why, exactly, companies are 
disclosing this fact, and whether disclosure means that they are, in some sense, 
being poisoned. The point suggests that sometimes disclosure will not really 
inform people, because their background beliefs will lead them to read the 
information badly. The question remains whether it is possible to give some 
contextual information, so that people have an accurate sense of what the 
disclosure actually means. In this context, we should probably be skeptical of the 
likelihood that the contextual information would really help. 
 
As a legal matter, the issue is simple, for EPA has no authority to use 
information disclosure as a substitute for regulation. In the particular context of 
the SWDA, Congress’ choice for regulatory mandates may even make sense. But 
in the future, it would be useful to allow agencies to experiment in this vein, to 
see if disclosure will, in some cases, do more good than alternative approaches. 
 
F. The Missing Question: Distributional Issues 
 
There is one significant gap in the discussion thus far: A full account of the 
distributional effects of different arsenic regulations. To have an adequate sense 
of whether and how to proceed, it would be most valuable to match the 
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assessment of the range of costs of the rule with an account of the income and 
wealth of those who will be subject to those costs. If, for example, those who 
would bear $300 or more in increased annual costs are also disproportionately 
poor, there is good reason for government to hesitate before imposing the 
regulation. It is easy to imagine a situation in which water quality regulation is 
“regressive,” in the sense that its costs come down especially hard on poor 
people. Now that is not a decisive objection to the regulation. But it is certainly 
an important point to consider. A statistical analysis, conducted on the basis of 
easily available data for this Article, suggests that in some states, the substantial 
increases in water bills would indeed be born by people whose median income is 
significantly below the state average.176 
 
Of course it would be easy to imagine the following sort of rejoinder: 
Shouldn’t poor people have water that is as safe as that of rich people? Why 
should poor people, including poor children, have water quality inferior to that 
enjoyed by rich people? The simplest answer is that safety is a matter of degree, 
and if safer water quality is very expensive, then poor people are better off 
without it than with it. Cars should certainly be safe, but rich people are more 
likely than poor people to buy Volvos. It would not be a good idea for the 
government to force poor people to buy Volvos, and the reason is that if you are 
poor, you might reasonably use what money you have on something other than 
adding an additional margin of safety to your car. Perhaps you will use that 
money on food, or medical care, or shelter. The same is true for water quality. If 
the consequence of decreasing (small) risks is significantly to decrease family 
income for poor people, then it is perfectly legitimate for the government to 
refuse to act. Of course it is possible that the benefits of environmental regulation 
will be enjoyed disproportionately by poor people, and that they will bear 
disproportionately few of the costs. 
 
The more general suggestion is that whenever an agency is producing a 
regulatory impact analysis, it should attempt a distributional analysis as well. It 
is important to know who will bear both the benefits and the burdens of 
regulation. A recent study shows, for example, that the benefits of pollution 
control in California have consisted, disproportionately, of poor people and 
                                                 
176In California, for example, the median income is about $40,000, while the $300  annual 
increases in water bills would affect families whose median income is about $35,500; in Illinois, 
the median income is about $41,000, while the $300 annual increases would affect families with 
median incomes of abot $38,000.  
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minority group members.177 It would be extremely desirable to assemble similar 
information for drinking water regulation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
My aim in this Article has been to cast light on the actual practice of CBA, 
by considering the EPA’s most highly publicized decision under the federal 
statute that most explicitly calls for that form of analysis. The basic message is 
that even when there is a considerable amount of scientific data, it is possible that 
CBA will only identify a range, and often a wide range at that. With plausible 
assumptions, the nonmonetized health benefits of new controls on arsenic in 
drinking water can be made to seem very small or very large. Once the health 
benefits are monetized, the range becomes larger still, making it extremely 
difficult to compare costs against benefits. 
 
It would be possible to take this demonstration as an attack on CBA, on 
the ground that a specification of benefits and costs tells us little that we did not 
know before.178 And if CBA is justified as a way of actually producing decisions 
in hard cases, CBA has indeed been criticized by the analysis here. But this 
would be the wrong lesson. As a substitute for intuitive toxicology, and for the 
crudeness of the affect heuristic, an effort to trace both costs and benefits can 
inform inquiry, making decisions less of a stab in the dark.  This is a substantial 
gain. Once the range is specified, a judgment of value, and not of fact, will be 
involved in the ultimate decision whether or not to proceed. But the judgment of 
value will be easier to identify once we know what we know and what we do not 
know. A real virtue of CBA is that it helps to explain exactly why the choice of 
regulation, in the case of arsenic, is genuinely difficult. In this way CBA is a large 
improvement over the “intuitive toxicology” seen in the public reaction to the 
decision of the Bush Administration. 
 
I have also attempted to provide a kind of lawyer’s primer on the law of 
CBA, showing how future cases might be litigated. There is no question that 
courts will eventually be asked to assess the kinds of questions raised in this 
Article.179 Lawyers can drive predicted benefits up or down by manipulating the 
dose-response curve, by raising epidemiological questions, by challenging the 
                                                 
177See Matthew E. Kahn., The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 Regulation 22 
(2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=267073. 
178This is one reading of Heinzerling, supra note 9. 
179See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).  
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discount rate, by asking about the voluntariness and controllability of the risk, 
and by quantifying difficult-to-quantify risks. We could easily imagine a dozen 
kinds of opinions, invalidating a 10 ppb standard as too stringent; we could 
easily imagine the same number of opinions, invalidating that standard as too 
lenient. Indeed, we could easily imagine an emerging set of doctrines in which 
courts produce a kind of common law of CBA. In view of the complexity of the 
underlying questions, many diverse views would undoubtedly be expressed by 
federal courts. I have urged that things would be simplified, and generally better, 
if courts maintained a posture of deference, rejecting agency views only in cases 
in which those views are patently unreasonable. There is indeed an emerging 
common law of cost-benefit analysis,180 but thus far it is being generated by 
agencies rather than courts. This is entirely proper. 
 
I have also discussed the underlying policy issues. EPA could make many 
reasonable decisions here, and in the range below 50 ppb and above 5 ppb, there 
is no obviously correct choice. But my principal claims have involved broadening 
the agencies’ viewscreen. First, agencies should have the flexibility to produce 
variable standards, targeting regulation to areas where it would survive cost-
benefit balancing, and also adopting economic incentives to ensure low-cost 
solutions. Second, agencies should be required to identify the winners and losers 
produced by regulation—to show where poor people, or rich people, are 
disproportionate losers or gainers.  A distributional analysis should not be taken 
as conclusive, but it will help to inform analysis. An effort to increase agency 
flexibility, and also to identify both winners and losers, would be natural steps, 
not toward placing regulatory judgments in an arithmetic straightjacket, but 
toward ensuring that when government acts, it does so in a way that is informed 
by a full account of the consequences.  
                                                 
180 See Adler & Posner supra note 6.  
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APPENDIX 
 
DOSE-RESPONSE CURVES 
 
To evaluate risks associated with toxic substances, and to undertake cost-
benefit analysis, it is often important to have a sense of the dose-response curve. 
For arsenic, clear evidence is absent. This appendix offer a sense of the 
possibilities. 
 
(A) Linear  Relationships 
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S.D. Murphy & K.L. Cheever, Effects of Feeding Insecticides: Inhibition of 
Carboxylesterase and Cholinesterase Activities in Rats, 17 Arch. Environ. Health, 
749 (1968), reprinted in Casarett and Doull’s Toxicology: The Basic Science of 
Poisons 19, fig.2-2 (Mary O. Amdur et. al, eds., Pergamon Press 4th ed. 1991). 
 
The dose-response curve can have a variety of shapes, including (a) linear, where 
response increases proportionally with dose. Figure (1) displays the linear  
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relationship between dietary dose of organophosphate insecticide dioxathion 
and inhibition of the enzyme cholinesterase in rats. 
 
(2) Dibenzanthracene
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Casarett and Doull’s Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons 23, fig.2-5 (Mary O. 
Amdur et. al, eds., Pergamon Press 4th ed. 1991), modified from W.R. Bryan & 
M.B. Shimkin, Quantitative Analysis of Dose-Response Data Obtained with 
Three Carcinogenic Hydrocarbons in Strain C3H Male Mice, 3 J. of Natl. Cancer 
Inst. 503 (1943). 
 
 
Figure (2) demonstrates another linear relationship, this one between 
subcutaneous administration of carcinogenic hydrocarbon dibenzanthracene and 
tumor incidence in mice. 
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(B) Sublinear  Relationships 
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C.L. Sanders & D.L. Lundgren, Pulmonary Carcinogenesis in the F344 and 
Wistar Rat after Inhalation of Plutonium Dioxide, 144 Radation Res. 206, 212 
(1995). 
 
Chemicals such as benzene, radon, and formaldehyde exhibit (b) sublinear 
dose-response relationships, where elicited responses are less than proportional. 
Figure (1) displays a sublinear relationship for primary pulmonary (lung) tumors 
in rats following exposure to plutonium dioxide.  
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(2) Phenobarbital
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Kirk T. Kitchin et al., Dose-Response Relationship in Multistage Carcinogenesis: 
Promoters, 102 (Suppl. 1) Env. Health Persp. 255, 257 (1994). 
 
 
Figure (2) exhibits a sublinear dose-response relationship between the number of 
female rat liver foci (a precursor to cancer) and the log dose of phenobarbital 
expressed as picomole per kilogram. 
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(C) Threshold  Relationships 
 
(1) Benzpyrene
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Casarett and Doull’s Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons 23, fig.2–5 (Mary 
O. Amdur et. al, eds., Pergamon Press 4th ed. 1991), modified from W.R. Bryan & 
M.B. Shimkin, Quantitative Analysis of Dose-Response Data Obtained with 
Three Carcinogenic Hydrocarbons in Strain C3H Male Mice, 3 J. of Natl. Cancer 
Inst., 503 (1943). 
 
 
 
Some chemicals produce no adverse effects below a certain level, resulting in 
a (c) threshold curve. Threshold-model agents include dioxins and chrysotile 
asbestos; in addition, nongenotoxic carcinogens are generally assumed to have 
threshold doses. Figure (1) demonstrates a threshold for the carcinogenic 
hydrocarbon benzpyrene causing sarcomas in mice. 
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(D) Supralinear  Relationships 
 
(1) Carboxylesterase
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S.D. Murphy & K.L. Cheever, Effects of Feeding Insecticides: Inhibition of 
Carboxylesterase and Cholinesterase Activities in Rats, 17 Arch. Environ. Health, 
749 (1968), reprinted in Casarett and Doull’s Toxicology: The Basic Science of 
Poisons 19, fig.2-2 (Mary O. Amdur et. al, eds., Pergamon Press 4th ed. 1991). 
 
 
Dose-response relationships exceeding proportionality, such as vinyl 
chloride, are (d) supralinear. Figure (1) demonstrates a supralinear curve for the 
inhibition of carboxylesterase enzyme activities in rats as a function of insecticide 
dioxathion dose.  
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(2) Atomic Bomb Radiation
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John W. Gofman, Radiation-Induced Cancer from Low-Dose Exposure, fig.14A, 
14F (1990), available at 
http://www.ratical.org/radation/CNR/RIC/chp14F.html#fig14e. 
 
 
  The slight concave-upward pattern in Figure (2) demonstrates a weaker 
supralinear relationship between exposure to radiation via an atomic bomb and 
cancer deaths per 10,000 people. 
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(E) U-Shaped  Relationships 
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Gordon A. Fox, EVR 2001: Risk and Toxicity 9-10, fig.2 (2000), available at 
chuma.cas.usf.edu/~gfox/EVR2001/risk_and_toxicity.pdf. 
 
 
Hermatic chemicals such as essential nutrients and vitamins exhibit 
beneficial effects at low doses, coupled with toxic effects at high doses, resulting 
in an (e) u-shaped curve. The dose-response relationship of fluoride, which 
exerts positive effects at lower doses but is toxic at high doses, is outlined in 
Figure (1). 
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